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ABSTRACT 
 Long working hours, 24/7 shift work, restricted sleep opportunities, and circadian 
misalignment all lead to degraded Sailor performance and impairments in decision 
making. These deficiencies threaten the safety of Sailors and a unit’s mission readiness, 
as the recent deadly collisions of the USS Fitzgerald and USS John. S. McCain exposed. 
Despite the headway made by the Navy in addressing crew endurance and fatigue issues, 
there is a capability gap in the surface navy’s ability to systematically assess and mitigate 
crew fatigue during in port and at-sea operations. It is imperative to provide operational 
leaders charged with ensuring peak mission readiness levels with insights into the current 
and predicted readiness levels of their Sailors. 
 This thesis developed a Microsoft Excel-based scheduling decision aid capable of 
tracking, detecting, and quantifying human performance risk factors associated with work 
and rest patterns for U.S. Navy Sailors. The Scheduling Management Aid for Risk 
Tracking (SMART) systematically collects Sailor activity data and provides trend 
analysis at an individual and organizational level, arming the scheduler with critical 
insight necessary for better crew resource management. The prototype’s tailorable 
heuristics are designed to identify and quantify human performance risk, enabling leaders 
to better mitigate risk through data-driven decision making. 
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The motivation behind this thesis was to reduce the likelihood of surface fleet 
mishaps like the four that occurred in 2017. Two separate collisions involving the USS 
Fitzgerald (DDG-62) and the USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) were fatal and resulted in 
the deaths of 17 Sailors and injury to many more. These mishaps resulted in degraded 
operational readiness, reduced mission availability, and increased operational tempos for 
the already limited available ships. Moreover, the unplanned repair costs for the USS 
Fitzgerald and the USS John S. McCain were estimated upward of $700 million taxpayer 
dollars (LaGrone, 2020; Ziezulewicz, 2018; Werner, 2017).  
U.S. Fleet Forces command released the Comprehensive Review of Recent Surface 
Force Incidents on November 2, 2017, which outlined their investigative findings and 
recommendations for corrective actions. One of the findings was that “Fatigue or 
ineffective fatigue/rest management was embedded in the four key mishaps that occurred 
in the Western Pacific” (U.S. Fleet Forces Command, 2017, p. 97). During the same month, 
the Department of the Navy published the Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance 
Management Policy. This policy established crew rest requirements and workday limits, 
mandated crew endurance training, and codified the use of circadian-based watchbills and 
shipboard routines designed to optimize watchstander alertness and sleep recuperation 
(Department of the Navy [DON], 2017). The policy’s intent was to ensure that “Sailors are 
adequately rested for safe, professional shipboard operations to deliver enhanced 
warfighting effectiveness” (DON, 2017, p. 1). Commanding Officers are expected to assess 
and mitigate risk during naval operations by using tools such as the Individual Risk 
Management Tool and weighing planning considerations like activity time guidelines 
(DON, 2017). Fatigue risk indicators such as prolonged wakefulness and insufficient sleep 
are associated with increased human performance risk (Shattuck et al., 2018; Shattuck & 
Matsangas, 2014).  
Currently, there is no systematic way to track work/rest activity information to 
provide an objective assessment of human performance risk onboard ships. The U.S. 
surface fleet lacks a diagnostic tool capable of assessing crew work and rest patterns to 
xxiv 
mitigate fatigue. This shortcoming results in a large knowledge gap and a missed 
opportunity to optimize work schedules, improve crew resource management, and mitigate 
for known fatigue risk indicators. The objective of this thesis was to develop a scheduling 
decision aid prototype in Microsoft Excel capable of recording work and rest activity data 
by tracking, detecting, and quantifying human performance risk factors. The intent was to 
enable schedulers to make data-driven risk management decisions regarding their 
personnel and evolution scheduling practices while also addressing the “can-do culture” 
and lack of fatigue management cited in the 2017 Comprehensive Review as attributable 
causes for the mishaps (p. 19).  
The Scheduling Management Aid for Risk Tracking (SMART) prototype is a 
tailorable Excel-based crew resource management tool and data repository for work/rest 
activity. The activity data can be used to support historical data analysis or analysis of 
projected work schedules or evolutions. The main advantages of this prototype are that it 
is scalable for use on various platforms or organizations; it is readily available at no 
additional cost onboard ships and at shore installations; and it does not require network 
connectivity which is restricted during certain operations. The main disadvantages for the 
prototype are that it currently requires manual data entry; relies on self-reported activity 
data; and requires computer access.  
The work/rest activity data repository tracks the following activities: watch (W), 
work (A), maintenance (M), and sleep/rest (S) in 15-minute increments from 00:00 to 
23:45. After the data repository was created, several heuristics were implemented to track, 
detect, and quantify human performance risk. The four activity thresholds for sleep/rest 
periods, total work periods, watch rotation type, and number of watch sections are by no 
means a comprehensive listing of human performance risk factors. Despite this limitation, 
the activity tracking and heuristics begin to address the problem of inadequate fatigue and 
rest management in the surface fleet. The numerical thresholds are tailorable but were 
based on a mixture of policy guidelines and scientific findings.  
The main outputs of the prototype are charts illustrating activity trends and 
averages, risk trends and counts, and a personnel listing by risk category. Users will be able 
to filter their results by time, organizational level, or by concern level rating or value. The 
xxv 
chart’s dynamic design instantaneously returns results based on the user’s filter selections. 
With these outputs, a user can visualize activity and risk trends and can then investigate 
the causes for those discrepancies. The user can make data-driven crew resource 
management decisions and implement fatigue mitigation actions.  
Now that the SMART prototype is complete, we have the option to develop it 
further, identify and field commercially available software with similar functions, or update 
existing software (e.g., RADM) with similar functionality. There are several wide-ranging 
applications for this prototype. For example, the prototype can offer insight into how the 
recent COVID-19 pandemic has impacted already strained operational schedules and 
individual workloads. Additionally, the activity information collected in this prototype 
would reduce the human performance risk data gap and enrich fatigue research models 
tailored to the military maritime environment. The activity data can also be used to clarify 
the disparity between the activity hours allocated versus the activity hours accomplished 
in manpower models to influence manning decisions.  
In conclusion, the U.S. Navy must invest in fatigue management tools and methods 
tailored to the surface combatant community to increase warfighter performance, 
operational effectiveness, operational safety, and crew endurance. We need to foster 
innovation and support cultural shifts aimed at decreasing the risk associated with degraded 
human performance. The SMART prototype is one effort to standardize data-driven human 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Working onboard a U.S. Navy warship is an inherently dangerous job where the 
stakes are high and the margin for error is thin. Sailors are tasked with ensuring that their 
ships can bring the fight to the enemy 24 hours a day, seven days a week when operationally 
deployed, often under the harshest working conditions.  
A. BACKGROUND 
The U.S. Navy’s surface fleet faced a year of reckoning in 2017, which culminated 
in the deaths of 17 U.S. Sailors. In the wake of three collisions and one grounding involving 
U.S. Navy warships, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) commissioned a 33-
member review team led by Commander, United States Fleet Forces Command 
(COMUSFLTFORCOM) to analyze the causes of the mishaps and provide 
recommendations to “ensure the safety of our [Sailors], safe operations at sea, and the 
readiness of our forces” (Department of the Navy [DON], 2017b, p. 3). The Comprehensive 
Review of Recent Surface Force Incidents (CR) consisted of 58 recommendations centered 
on key training, operational safety, ship readiness, and ship culture concerns (DON, 
2017b). An adapted list of attributable causes for the mishaps showcase the troubling trend 
of the negative effects of sleep-deprived and overburdened watchstanders (Table 1). Some 
factors which impair a warfighter’s physical performance and decision making are long 
working days, severe stress, shift work, restricted sleep opportunities, and circadian 
desynchrony (Shattuck et al., 2019; Kilgore et al., 2006; Larsen & Tandberg, 2001; Naval 
Safety Center [NSC], 2009). Compromised human performance and decision making, 
when combined with other factors like subpar watchstanders, ineffective training 
programs, and equipment degradations, can lead to suboptimum warfighter performance, 
increased safety risks to the individual and the organization, and the loss of strategic 
military assets and human life as exposed by the mishaps in 2017 (DON, 2017b). 
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Table 1. Matrix of Mishap Attributes. Adapted from DON (2017b). 












X X X X 
Primary Cause: 
Human Error 
X X X X 
 
In the three years since the CR was published, the Navy continues to make great 
strides towards tackling the issues highlighted in the report. Circadian-based watchbills 
and corresponding shipboard routines designed to improve watchstander alertness and 
sleep quality are now the norm rather than the exception. Another significant development 
was the release of the Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy 
(CFEMP) on November 30, 2017. The Naval Surface Force Commanders of U.S. Pacific 
Fleet and Atlantic Fleet created the policy which established crew rest requirements, 
workday limits, crew endurance training, and fatigue mitigation steps with the goal of 
achieving “optimal crew endurance, performance, and safety” (DON, 2017a, p. 1). This 
policy marked a major cultural shift for naval surface forces and a stronger commitment to 
addressing systemic crew endurance issues which have plagued the Navy for decades. 
Several previous Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) master’s theses that studied the 
work and rest balance onboard ships arrived at a similar conclusion: USN Sailors routinely 
worked longer and slept fewer hours than the recommended guidelines (Davey, 2013; 
Fletcher, 2018; Green, 2009, Haynes, 2007, Mason, 2009). Inadequate manning levels 
throughout the surface fleet have contributed to increased Sailor workloads, acute and 
chronic sleep debt, increased fatigue levels, negative mood, and poor sleep quality which 
have manifested in impaired warfighter effectiveness (Fletcher, 2018; Garbacz, 2019; 
Murph, 2019; Davey, 2013; Yokeley, 2012; Young, 2013; Green, 2009, Haynes, 2007, 
Mason, 2009). Inadequate manning also impacts how ships approach creating operational 
schedules and personnel assignments. In Captain Frank Walter’s Proceedings article 
entitled “A Better Way to Build a Watchbill,” he writes about how “most ships treat writing 
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the watchbills for at-sea operations as an economics problem: Watches needing to be filled 
are the ‘demand’ and divisions the ‘supply’” (Walter, 2020, p. 1). While the effects of 
insufficient manning will not be remedied overnight, leaders and schedulers can implement 
steps to mitigate their impact.  
Despite the headway that has been made in addressing crew endurance and fatigue 
issues within the U.S. Navy, there is still room for improvement. A capability gap exists in 
the surface navy’s ability to systematically assess and mitigate crew fatigue for in port and 
at-sea operations. To make meaningful steps in maximizing crew resilience and improving 
warfighter performance, it is imperative to arm decision makers with ways to develop 
smarter watchbills and schedules. One way to accomplish this goal would be to incorporate 
the work and rest activity information of each Sailor into the scheduling tool to balance 
crew workloads and limited sleep opportunities. Commanding officers (COs) charged with 
managing and mitigating risk during their military operations lack a data-driven method to 
assess and evaluate the readiness levels of their Sailors. Moreover, schedulers do not have 
a standardized way onboard ships to collect and integrate their Sailors’ work and rest hours 
into the watchbill making process. Schedulers need to be mindful of how chronic and acute 
sleep debt, poor sleep quality, and excessive hours of wakefulness impair warfighter 
performance. In order to address the “can-do culture” (p. 9) and lack of “fatigue 
management” (p. 38) cited in the CR as causes for the string of mishaps in from 2007 to 
2017, we must provide COs and schedulers the means to make data-driven risk 
management decisions regarding their personnel and evolution scheduling practices 
(2017b).  
B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
Unlike previous NPS studies  that primarily focused on accounting for Sailors’ 
sleep, fatigue, and work/rest patterns during in port (Garbacz, 2019) and underway periods 
(Haynes, 2007; Green, 2009; Mason, 2009; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014; Davey, 2013; 
Yokeley, 2012; Young, 2013; Kerno, 2014), this thesis focuses on the creation of a decision 
aid that will allow leaders and schedulers to make more informed personnel scheduling 
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decisions while incorporating the rest and activity thresholds established in the CFEMP 
(DON, 2017a) and from years of validated scientific research.  
The objective of this thesis is to develop a prototype scheduling decision aid (SDA) 
in Microsoft (MS) Excel that will allow schedulers to collect and incorporate a Sailor’s 
prior work and rest history. MS Excel is readily available and widely used on ships and 
will not require extensive training or expenditures. The intent is to provide a way to 
systematically assess human performance risk while enabling schedulers to make more 
informed decisions when creating personnel and ship schedules. The data repository for 
the crew’s work and rest schedules will enable schedulers to systematically record, track 
and detect human performance risk factors, create rest-optimized work schedules, and 
perform activity trend analysis based on an individual’s work and rest activity data. The 
desired end state of this research is to have a transparent and data-driven process to manage 
Sailors’ workloads while focusing on fatigue mitigation efforts at the individual and 
organizational levels during the watchbill creation process.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With the objective of creating a prototype MS Excel SDA capable of detecting and 
flagging human performance risk associated with a Sailor’s work and rest activity data 
guiding this research effort, this thesis seeks to answer the following research questions: 
• Can a data repository be structured to enable users to track and detect 
human performance risk factors, create rest-optimized schedules, and 
conduct activity trend and data analysis based on an individual’s 
associated work and rest activity data? 
• What are some human performance risk factors and thresholds that can be 
applied to the available work and rest activity information?  
• What are the required inputs, constraints, and outputs to create a rest-
optimized schedule? 
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• Can information from this thesis be used to incorporate workload 
management and fatigue mitigation activities during the watchbill and 
ship’s schedule creation process?  
• How should the usability, feasibility, and acceptability of this scheduling 
aid be assessed? 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter I presented an introduction to the study’s purpose and scope. Chapter II 
includes a literature review with relevant information on sleep, human performance risks 
associated with sleep loss and excessive wakefulness, fatigue risk models and scheduling 
tools, regulations and policies governing work and rest activity for seafarers, and the 
watchbill creation and personnel assignment process onboard U.S. Navy ships. Chapter III 
describes the approach in prototype development and analysis for this study while Chapter 
IV discusses the results. Chapter V offers insights, discussions, and conclusions from the 
study. Lastly, Chapter VI offers recommendations and areas for future research based on 
the study’s findings. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will focus on relevant information regarding the importance 
of sleep, fatigue, and work and rest activity regulations for seafarers, and the watchbill 
creation process onboard U.S. Navy warships.  
A. SLEEP IN THE MILITARY 
Decades’ worth of research into the military community show that service members 
are habitually sleep-deprived. The components of duration, timing, and quality play an 
important role in determining good sleep. Long working hours, operational commitments, 
and the 24/7 nature of military operations routinely result in inadequate sleep opportunities 
for service members. The following section aims to highlight the connections between 
unsatisfactory sleep, circadian misalignment, increased fatigue, and degraded human 
performance (Shattuck et al., 2018). 
Obtaining enough sleep onboard a U.S. Navy warship is often a challenge. Various 
environmental, organizational, pathological, and psychological/pharmacological factors 
contribute to disrupted sleep for military personnel at sea (Figure 1). Operational and 
mission requirements which necessitate 24/7 operations and manning shortfalls regularly 
result in excessively long workdays, often to the detriment of a Sailor’s health and 
performance (Brown, 2012; Garbacz, 2019; Murph, 2019). Increased workloads and 
operational requirements leave Sailors more susceptible to acute and chronic sleep loss, 
which can present a significant threat to safety and operational effectiveness onboard ships 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014). As naval missions grow more complex and the margin for 
error decreases, more attention must be devoted to ensuring Sailors receive adequate 
amounts and quality of sleep. The safe and continued operation of warships requires a 
cultural shift where mission requirements are balanced with work and rest guidelines to 
minimize the operational and personal risk and maximize group performance and safety in 
everyday operations (Good, 2019; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2017). 
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Sleep disorders, such as insomnia and sleep apnea, and pain, both physical and psychological, can 
contribute to disrupted sleep. Stimulants include caffeine, energy drinks, or nicotine.  
Figure 1. Factors Leading to Disrupted Sleep at Sea. Adapted from 
Shattuck and Matsangas (2017) and Shattuck, Matsangas, and 
Dahlman (2018). 
1. Sleep Overview 
Sleep is a basic requirement for human life. An extensive amount of scientific 
research suggests that the physiological need for sleep is due to the many benefits it 
provides. According to Vyazovskiy, “sleep plays an active role in processes such as 
synaptic plasticity and memory functions, emotional regulation, metabolic functions and 
energy balance, macromolecule biosynthesis, removal of toxic substances and metabolic 
waste, or prophylactic cellular maintenance” (2015, p. 171). Forgoing sleep, just like 
forgoing water and food, will degrade bodily functions and ultimately lead to death. While 
there are only anecdotal reports of sleep deprivation leading to death in humans, previous 
animal studies on the topic link total sleep deprivation to death (Everson et al., 1989; Naitoh 
et al., 1990). Individuals may report feeling less alert or more tired and fatigued when they 
obtain insufficient sleep. Partial sleep deprivation arises when an individual obtains less 
sleep than they need while total sleep deprivation occurs when an individual is unable to 
obtain any sleep at all (Shattuck et al., 2018). When a person is sleep-deprived, they often 
suffer from increased sleep inertia, or the interim state between wake and sleep where they 
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have decreased arousal and cognitive function, which can vary in duration based on the 
severity of sleep deprivation (Shattuck et al., 2018).  
As humans age, our sleep patterns change as is indicated by the changing number 
and duration of wake and sleep cycles in Figure 2 (Miller et al., 2007). Moreover, the 
amount of sleep humans require for optimal performance shifts as we age. Additional 
information on sleep physiology and sleep architecture is available in the book Sleep 
Disorders and Sleep Deprivation: An Unmet Public Health Problem (Committee on Sleep 
Medicine and Research et al., 2006, pp. 33–49). While different people may require 
varying amounts of sleep for optimal performance, the National Sleep Foundation (NSF) 
recommends that healthy adults between the ages of 18 and 64 years old get seven to nine 
hours of sleep per night (National Sleep Foundation [NSF], 2015). On average, Americans 
reported getting 7.6 hours of sleep per night which is below the NSF’s recommended 
minimum (Sleep Foundation, 2014; NSF, 2015). Moreover, 67% of Americans who 
reported receiving less than good sleep quality also reported “poor” or “only fair” health; 
this finding highlights the association between sleep quality and overall health (Sleep 
Foundation, 2014, para. 2).  
Figure 2. Sleep Requirements throughout Life. Source: Miller, 
Matsangas, and Shattuck (2007). 
10 
A large percentage of U.S. Navy personnel fall in the 25- and- younger age group 
while the rest of the USN population falls between the range of 26 to about 40 years old 
(Figure 3). While the NSF recommends that both age groups obtain between seven to nine 
hours of sleep per day to function optimally, several studies involving the work and rest 
activity of naval personnel routinely show that Sailors receive significantly less than the 
recommended amount of sleep per day (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 3. Naval Postgraduate School Sleep Studies from 2002 to 
2017. Source: Shattuck and Matsangas (2017). 
Previous NPS studies on the work/rest patterns of U.S. Navy Sailors also revealed 
that Sailors suffer from impaired sleep quality (Murph, 2019; Young, 2013; Yokeley, 2012; 
Roberts, 2012). The phenomenon of operating with sleep debt is not isolated to one ship 
type and occurs regardless of a ship’s operational phase (Figure 4). All NPS sleep study 
participants received below the recommended eight hours of sleep, as denoted by the 
vertical red line in Figure 4, with the exception of the 2014 Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 2 
Rough Water Trials group. The greater than average number of sleep hours was largely 
attributed to the high sea state during the study where many of the crew members 
experienced motion sickness and were relegated to their sleeping quarters (Figure 4). The 
recommended sleep times and amounts of sleep are important considerations when 
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comparing typical Sailor underway and in port work schedules. Due to the 24/7 nature of 
maritime military operations, most Sailors are required to work on shifts where their 
wake/sleep cycles rarely align with the recommended wake/sleep cycle for adults (Shattuck 
et al., 2014). These out-of-phase work and sleep schedules result in chronic circadian 
misalignment in the form of 18 to 20-hour long days with little opportunity for adequate 
rest and recovery (Shattuck et al., 2014).  
 
Note 1: Blue bars refer to actigraphic sleep, whereas orange bars refer to self-reported sleep. 
Note 2: Number centered on each bar refers to study sample size. 
Note 3: Horizontal lines refer to one standard deviation.  
Figure 4. Naval Postgraduate School Sleep Studies from 2001 to 
2020. Source: N. Shattuck, PowerPoint slides (November 16, 
2020). 
The pattern of operating while sleep-deprived is not isolated to U.S. Navy personnel 
but is also common among other military service branches. An assessment of the average 
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daily sleep duration of over 6,000 active duty service members, from 33 studies with data 
collected during a range of different military operation types, underscored the 
pervasiveness of military members operating in a sleep-deprived state (Shattuck et al., 
2018). Most participants fell below the 7-hour recommendation for good health; none of 
the participants exceeded the 8-hour standard for maximum cognitive functioning (Figure 
5). Sleep deprivation and chronic sleep restriction are often associated with degraded 
waking neurobehavioral functions which manifest as sleepiness and reduced attentiveness, 
cognitive speed, and memory impairments (Goel et al., 2013). Furthermore, service 
members consistently get less sleep when compared to their civilian counterparts with a 
large percentage receiving five or fewer hours of sleep a day (Figure 6). Obtaining adequate 
sleep continues to be a major risk factor for safety mishaps and regularly affects a Sailor’s 
performance and productivity.  
 
Figure 5. Average Daily Sleep Duration in Various Military 
Environments. Source: Shattuck, Matsangas, and Dahlman (2018). 
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Figure 6. Average Hours of Sleep per Day Comparison between 
Civilians and Military Personnel. Source: Shattuck and Matsangas 
(2017). 
2. Impacts of Insufficient or Poor Sleep  
According to Goel and colleagues, research over the past decade has associated 
circadian desynchrony with conditions such as weight gain, obesity, diabetes, 
hypertension, and heightened mortality (Goel et al., 2013). Research suggests that 
disruptions to an individual’s circadian rhythm results in altered melatonin production and 
disrupted sleep-wake cycles (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014). Compared to those individuals 
who work during the day, night shift workers often experience more sleep deprivation, 
shorter periods of sleep, more fragmented sleep, and higher levels of fatigue (Arendt et al., 
2006). The negative outcomes associated with shiftwork becomes more significant because 
the shift workers may suffer from circadian scarring. Circadian scarring can result in sleep 
problems that affect a person beyond their work shifts and even years after they leave the 
work force (Shattuck et al., 2018; Monk et al., 2013). Moreover, shiftwork and night shifts 
are associated with higher levels of physiological fatigue, increased weight gain, higher 
risk of developing health disorders such as obesity and heart disease, and negative social 
outcomes like decreased marital satisfaction (Howarth et al., 1999; Shattuck & Matsangas, 
2014).  
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A large body of work exists on the deleterious effects of sleep deprivation and sleep 
disruption on humans. Table 3 provides an overview of risk factors which contribute to 
sleep disruption and deprivation. The short-term effects of insufficient sleep range from 
the inability to learn and retain information, poor judgment, poor mood, delayed reaction 
times and increased error rates, decreased vigilance, and reduced short-term memory 
(Division of Sleep Medicine [DSM], n.d.; Shattuck et al., 2018). The short-term and 
intermediate-term consequences of not obtaining enough sleep pose a significant risk to 
the individual and the crew due to the increased risk for serious accidents or injury 
(Shattuck et al., 2018). The Division of Sleep Medicine at Harvard University states that 
the effects of chronic sleep deprivation, or long-term sleep loss, is associated with a 
multitude of health problems like obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and shortened 
lifespan (DSM, n.d.). Additional intermediate and long-term effects of poor sleep habits 
are illustrated in Figure 7. 
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Table 2. Risk Factors Contributing to Sleep Deprivation and Disruption. 
Adapted from Medic et al. (2017). 
Category Risk Factors 
Lifestyle 
• Consuming excessive amounts of caffeine 
• Drinking alcohol 
• Drug abuse 
• Shift work 
• Attending university 
• Jet lag 
Environmental • Excessive noise (e.g., industrial wind turbines) 
• Excessive light 
Psychosocial 
• Anxiety, worry, and rumination 
• Parents of young children 
• Caregivers to a family member with a chronic, life-
threatening, or terminal illness 
Sleep disorder 
• Insomnia 
• Obstructive sleep apnea 
• Restless leg syndrome 
• Narcolepsy 
• Circadian rhythm disorders 
Medical conditions 
• Pain 
• Restrictive lung disease 
• Chronic kidney disease 
• Diabetes 
• Neurodegenerative disease 
• Psychiatric disorders 
• Use of certain medications 
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Figure 7. Consequences of Poor Sleep Practices. Adapted from 
Shattuck, Matsangas, and Dahlman (2018). 
A 2018 NPS thesis by Christine Fletcher highlighted the disparity between the 
shipboard requirements that were accounted for in fleet manpower documents and how 
Sailors were forced to adapt to manning shortfalls by working longer hours (Fletcher, 
2018). Figure 8 is Fletcher’s At-Sea Shipboard Workload Model which graphically shows 
the various requirements for enlisted personnel that are accounted for (green), partially 
included (yellow), and unaccounted for (red) in the fleet manpower documents. While the 
majority of requirements are accounted for in the Personal Time, Operational Manning, 
and Own Unit Support categories, there are many items under Training Allowance, Service 
Diversion, and Maintenance categories which are not currently accounted for when 








•Reduced short term memory
•Negative mood
•Increased risk of injury and 
death
•Increase in stress hormone 
production
Intermediate Effects
•Loss of motivation and 
morale
•Poor memory
•Longer time to train
•Decreased immunity
•Caffeine addiction





•Chronic disease due to 




The items in green denote requirements which are included within the Fleet Manpower Requirements Determination (FMRD) 
model. Yellow indicates requirements that are partially included; red indicates requirements that are not included within the FMRD.  
Figure 8. Enlisted Personnel Workload Demands during Condition III Steaming. Source: Fletcher (2018). 
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Impaired perception, judgment paired with reduced efficiency, and sleep 
deprivation lead to increased rates of errors and accidents (DSM, n.d.). Several analysts 
estimate that the 2017 collisions involving the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCain 
may ultimately cost U.S. taxpayers over $500 million (LaGrone, 2017) and $220 million 
(Werner, 2017) in repairs, respectively. The deaths of seven Sailors on the USS Fitzgerald 
and ten on the USS John S. McCain, respectively, were sobering reminders of the heavy 
toll sleep loss can take. To counteract the effects of sleep-induced performance impairment, 
people often implement a variety of techniques like napping, exposing themselves to bright 
lights, and consuming stimulants like coffee or energy drinks (Kerno, 2014). While these 
may result in temporary increases in alertness, human performance, and efficiency, 
employing fatigue countermeasures is not a sustainable practice; the only long-term way 
to alleviate the effects of fatigue due to sleep deprivation is to get adequate sleep (Darwent 
et al., 2015).  
B. FATIGUE IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT 
The fatigue resulting from inadequate sleep, circadian rhythm interruption, and 
acute or chronic mental strain presents a considerable risk to personal and group safety, 
mission success, and national security (Miller & Eddy, 2008; Good et al., 2019). Fatigue 
is defined by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as “the degradation of human 
performance, the slowing down of physical and mental reflexes and/or the impairment of 
the ability to make rational judgments” (International Maritime Organization [IMO], 1993, 
p. 3). Fatigue is an overarching term which can include physical and mental causes. 
Physical fatigue can be attributed to sleep deprivation or sustained periods of physical 
activity while mental stress, emotional overtiredness, or elevated workloads can contribute 
to elevated levels of mental fatigue (Jepsen et al., 2015). Inadequate or insufficient sleep is 
a major determinant of fatigue which can impair physical performance, such as speed and 
strength, and mental performance, such as delayed reaction times and decision making 
(Jepsen et al., 2015). Irregular sleep patterns due to shiftwork, excessive workloads, and 
disturbed or shortened sleep periods contribute to prolonged wakefulness (Miller & Eddy, 
2008; Miller et al., 2007). Prolonged wakefulness is typically defined as more than 16 hours 
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between two sleep periods which can result in acute and chronic mental fatigue (Miller & 
Eddy, 2008). The consequences of work-related fatigue can range from minor mishaps to 
devastating disasters. Workers in the maritime industry report increased levels of fatigue 
and sleepiness due to the shiftwork nature of their watches, increased workloads, rotating 
work schedules, and less than ideal sleeping conditions (Jepsen et al., 2015).  
Many studies have associated military service and lifestyles with several fatigue-
causing factors such as prolonged wakefulness and acute and chronic sleep loss (Shattuck 
& Matsangas, 2016). After the deadly collision between the USS John McCain and tanker 
Alnic MC on August 21, 2017, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) released 
a report in 2019 which attributed the watch team’s acute fatigue as a causal factor of the 
collision (National Transportation Safety Board [NTSB], 2019). The acute fatigue 
experienced by the lee helmsman, conning officer, Boatswain’s Mate of the Watch 
(BMOW), Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD), and Officer of the Deck (OOD), each of 
whom had received fewer than five hours of sleep the previous night, impaired the watch 
team’s ability to properly and effectively execute the required actions to avoid the collision 
(NTSB, 2019; DON, 2017b). The accident also occurred between the hours of 0200 and 
0600, which coincides with the circadian low point, a time when the body is usually more 
fatigued and suffers from decreased levels of alertness (Goel et al., 2013; Miller & Eddy, 
2008; Miller et al., 2007; Mysliwiec et al., 2016).  
Naval operations are inherently dangerous and require vigilant Sailors who can 
assess and mitigate risk to accomplish mission tasking. A fatigued Sailor reduces mission 
readiness, impacts team effectiveness and performance, and introduces unnecessary risk to 
in port and at-sea operations. Sleep is foundational to optimal human performance and 
resiliency and inadequate sleep results in degraded physical and cognitive performance, 
increased fatigue levels, poor morale, reduced individual and team resilience, and a myriad 
of other negative outcomes (Good et al., 2019; Young-McCaughan et al., 2018; Shattuck 
et al., 2018).  
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C. MARITIME WORK AND REST ACTIVITY REGULATIONS 
The general trend of increased shipping intensity has historically resulted in rising 
crew workloads for ships and continues to do so today (Simkuva et al., 2016). Despite the 
rising levels of work, the commercial maritime industry has not experienced an associated 
uptick in its work force to compensate for the increased workloads. The increased 
operational risk associated with longer working hours led to the creation of regulations 
such as the International Safety Management (ISM) Code and the International Ship and 
Port Facility Security (ISPS) code. These regulations laid bare the prevalence of systematic 
violations in the enforcement of work and rest hour policies (Simkuva et al., 2016). With 
the global shipping industry being responsible for transporting as much as 90% of world 
trade, maritime shipping traffic growth is not expected to abate any time soon (Kinsey, 
2020). The subsequent increase in seafarer workloads, especially relevant for ships that 
carry dangerous goods, considerably diminish maritime safety due to increased fatigue 
levels (Wadsworth et al., 2008; Jepsen et al., 2015). 
In order to mitigate the risk from fatigued seafarers, work and rest activity hours 
were regulated in the shipping industry under the provisions of the International 
Convention of Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW) from 2010 (IMO, n.d.) and the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) from 2006. 
The regulations outlined in Table 4 explicitly stated minimum and maximum limits for 
work and rest periods for ship’s crews and created reporting requirements for regulation 
violations. Table 4 also includes relevant maritime work and rest hour guidelines from the 
United States Code (United States Code [USC], 2016), Navy Availability Factor (NAF) 
(OPNAVINST 1000.16L, 2015), Navy Standard Work Week (NSWW) (OPNAVINST 
1000.16K, 2007), and the Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy 
(COMNAVSURFPAC/COMNAVSURFLANT INST 3120.2, 2017). The civilian 
maritime industry has commercially available tools capable of tracking compliance with 
these work and rest policies such as CREWEXPRESS by SHIPIP Ltd., ISF Watchkeeper 
by the IT Energy and the International Shipping Federation, and Navigator Port modules 
by DNV GL. Presently, the U.S. Navy does not have an analogous tool onboard ships 
21 
capable of tracking work and rest activity hours where users can assess the work/rest levels 
of their Sailors.  
Table 3. Maritime Work and Rest Time Regulations. Adapted from 
Simkuva, Purins, Mihailova, and Mihailovs (2016) and Shattuck 
and Matsangas (2017). 
Standard 
Work/Rest in any Rest period amount and 






Work ≤ 14 
hours 
 
Rest ≥ 10 hours 
 
Work ≤ 72 
hours 
 
Rest ≥ 77 
hours 
Not more than 2 rest periods, 
one of which shall be at least 6 
hours 
 
Interval between rest periods of 
less than 14 hours 
STCW Rest ≥ 10 hours  Rest ≥ 77 hours 
Not more than 2 rest periods 
 
Interval between rest periods of 
less than 14 hours 
USC  Work ≤ 36 hours   
NAF   Work ≤ 81 hours  
NSWW   Rest ≥ 56 hours  
DON 
Work ≤ 12 




Rest ≥ 7 hours 
  
Rest must be one uninterrupted 
7-hour period or broken up as 
separate 5-hour and 2-hour 
uninterrupted blocks 
 
One of the NTSB’s recommendations based on their findings from the 2017 
collision between the USS John S. McCain and Tanker Alnic was for the U.S. Navy to 
adopt comparable work and rest standards from the STCW (NTSB, 2019). While civilian 
and military mariners operate in similar environments, careful consideration should be 
applied when defining and adopting work and rest hour limits. Over a decade’s worth of 
research involving 35 U.S. Navy ships and nearly 1,700 Sailors by NPS’s Crew Endurance 
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Team show that USN Sailors are often subjected to unrelentingly high workloads, 
constantly shifting work schedules, and different types of stressors when compared to their 
civilian counterparts (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2020).  
A retrospective analysis comparing the work and rest activity patterns of 184 
servicemembers from the USS Nimitz with the seafarers’ work/rest activity regulations 
listed in Table 4 found that USN Sailors routinely worked past established limits (Figure 
9) and obtained insufficient amounts of rest (Figure 10) (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2017). 
Figure 9 shows that USN Sailors exceed seafarer work time limits by approximately 25% 
during 24-hour periods, 50% during any 3-day period, and 80% during any 7-day work 
period. Furthermore, the results highlight the impact of rotating non-circadian watch 
schedules (i.e., 5/10) on work and rest activity hours. Sailors under the 5/10 work schedule 
were subject to longer work hours, both daily and per 7-day period, and more limited 
sleep/rest opportunities when compared to Sailors with static watch times (i.e., 3/9) 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2017).  
 
Figure 9. Rate of Excessive Maritime Work Hour Limits Comparison 
by Varying Criterion. Source: Shattuck and Matsangas (2017). 
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Figure 10. Rate of Insufficient Rest/Sleep Hour Limits Comparison by 
Varying Criterion. Source: Shattuck and Matsangas (2017). 
The USN’s adoption of circadian-based watchbills has been associated with 
increased alertness, reduced daytime sleepiness, improved sleep quality and mood, and 
increased psychomotor vigilance performance (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2019). An 
assessment of the utility of circadian-based schedules for surface combatants found that 
there were a multitude of benefits associated with circadian-based watchbills and routines 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2019). Most of the participants reported feeling better rested as 
the main benefit, but they also experienced improved overall performance in the form of 
increased situational awareness, increased productivity, and improved 
performance/endurance (Figure 11). The study also evaluated the combined effect of 
occupational stressors on the participants by analyzing the aggregate metrics collected from 
several assessments. The aggregate metrics are sorted into figure of merits (FOM) defined 
as FOM3 and FOM4, consisting of the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS), Insomnia Severity 
Index (ISI), and Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) and the ESS, ISI, PSQI, and Profile 
of Mood States (POMS), respectively. Their analysis revealed that the type of watchbill 
(e.g., fixed or rotating) and the number of sections (e.g., 2, 3, or 4) were statistically 
significant predictors for the FOM3 and FOM4 scores (all p <0.02). 
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Figure 11. Benefits of the Implementation of Circadian-based 
Watchbills and Routines onboard USN Vessels. Source: Shattuck 
and Matsangas (2019). 
Despite the reported benefits of fixed watch schedules and more watch sections, the 
lack of qualified personnel, lack of time for events such as meetings, drills, or training, and 
scheduling conflicts act as barriers for the implementation of circadian-based schedules 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2019). Another important note is that even when circadian watch 
rotations were implemented, they did not always result in Sailors obtaining more sleep 
when compared to Sailors on non-circadian watch schedules. The same circadian-based 
schedule utility study found that while the sleep duration between circadian versus non-
circadian watchbills were not dissimilar, the non-circadian watchstanders were unable to 
sufficiently meet the normal sleep requirements of “timing, duration, and quality” 
(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2019, p. 45). Moreover, several Crew Endurance Team studies 
identified that excessive workloads and increased tasking requirements greatly contributed 
to higher levels of Sailor fatigue. The Team’s studies found that USN Sailors worked 12-
hours/day with roughly 25% of them working 13-hour days and 10% working 14-hour days 
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(Shattuck & Matsangas, 2020). The increased workloads and requirements translate to over 
50% of USN Sailors working more than 84 hours per week and approximately 10% 
working 98 hours or more per week.  
While existing regulations on seafarers’ work and rest limits allow for an 
assessment of known fatigue factors, they do not directly address the sources for fatigue at 
sea. Currently, USN manning models do not entirely account for the time involved in 
meeting tasking requirements which result in insufficient manning levels and contribute to 
the excessive work hours (Fletcher, 2018). Adopting STCW, MLC, or other crew rest 
requirements without tackling the root causes of fatigue will not remedy the U.S. Navy’s 
crew endurance and fatigue management issues. Until these root causes can be addressed 
more directly, more effort should be placed on finding ways to optimize the work and rest 
patterns of USN Sailors (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2017).  
D. FATIGUE RISK MODELS AND SCHEDULING TOOLS 
The following section outlines selected sleep, fatigue, and human performance 
biomathematical models and scheduling tools which have been tailored for use in the 
military environment. These tools can provide warfighters and decision makers with 
valuable insight into individual and crew readiness levels which may affect current and 
future military operations. A more comprehensive list of biomathematical models is 
available in Appendix A from Mallis and colleagues (2004) which provides brief model 
descriptions, prediction goals, implemented capabilities, required inputs, and primary 
outputs. 
1. Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) Model 
The Sleep, Activity, Fatigue, and Task Effectiveness (SAFTE) model was 
developed by Hursh and his colleagues (2003) at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research 
over 25 years ago. The model has been used extensively by commercial and military 
entities like the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the Department of 
Defense (DOD). SAFTE is a three-process model which integrates the following 
information: (1) circadian rhythms, (2) cognitive performance recovery and decay rates 
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associated with sleep and wakefulness, respectively, and (3) cognitive performance effects 
associated with sleep inertia to create a model of predicted human cognitive effectiveness 
(Hursh, 2003). The SAFTE model’s general design includes the sleep regulation and the 
performance modulation components (Figure 12). The sleep regulation component is 
influenced by the hours of sleep and wakefulness, existing sleep debt, the circadian process, 
and sleep fragmentation (Figure 12). The performance modulation component is dependent 
upon the current balance of the sleep reservoir, a byproduct of the sleep regulation 
component, circadian oscillations, and sleep inertia which outputs a measure of cognitive 
effectiveness (Air Force Research Laboratory [AFRL], 2003).  
 
Figure 12. Schematic of the SAFTE Model. Source: Air Force 
Research Laboratory (2003). 
While more laboratory and field validation studies are required to assess the 
adequacy of the SAFTE model’s application within the maritime operational environment, 
the model does offer some essential features and advantages (Table 5) which allow for 
performance predictions with varying work schedules and sleep deprivation levels. 
Notably, the model does not account for the effects of sleep fragmentation, circadian 
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variations, jet lag due to time zone shifts, shiftwork, around the clock performance, and 
sub-optimal sleep schedules – all of which are commonplace onboard U.S. warships. 
Further refinement of the model within the maritime domain could result in more accurate 
predictive values of Sailor performance.  
Table 4. SAFTE Model Key Features and Advantages. Adapted from the 
AFRL (2003). 
Key Features Advantages 
Model is homeostatic. Gradual decreases 
in sleep debt decrease sleep intensity. 
Predicts the normal decline in sleep 
intensity during the sleep period. 
Progressive increases in sleep debt 
produced by extended periods of less-
than-optimal levels of sleep lead to 
increased sleep intensity. 
Predicts the normal equilibrium of 
performance under less-than-optimal 
schedules of sleep. 
Model delays sleep accumulation at the 
start of each sleep period. 
Predicts the detrimental effects of sleep 
fragmentation and multiple interruptions 
in sleep. 
Model incorporates a multi-oscillator 
circadian process. 
Predicts the asymmetrical cycle of 
performance around the clock. 
Circadian process and Sleep-Wake Cycle 
are additive to predict variations in 
performance. 
Predicts the mid-afternoon dip in 
performance, as well as the more 
predominant nadir in performance that 
occurs in the early morning. 
Model modulates the intensity of sleep 
according to the time of day. 
Predicts circadian variations in sleep 
quality. 
Model includes a factor to account for the 
initial lag in performance upon 
awakening. 
Predicts limits on performance under 
schedules that arrange daytime sleep. 
Model incorporates adjustment to new 
time zones or shift schedules. 
Predicts sleep inertia that is proportional 
to sleep debt. 
Predicts temporary “jet lag” effects and 
adjustment to shift work. 
 
2. Circadian Rhythm and Shiftwork 
The inclination to sleep is a primal requirement modulated by a homeostatic process 
(Borbély, 1982; Shattuck et al., 2018). The sleep and wakefulness process cycles in a 
roughly 24.5 to 25-hour sinusoidal pattern (Borbély, 1982; Shattuck et al., 2018). The 
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human biological clock, or circadian rhythm, regulates many important biological 
functions like sleep and wake patterns, cellular activities, immune system functions, and 
dietary decisions (Potter et al., 2016, Achermann, 2003; Van Dongen & Dinges, 2000). 
Studies have shown that the different phases of the circadian clock can be influenced by 
exposure to environmental light (Figueiro et al., 2017) and shifting mealtimes (Wehrens et 
al., 2017).  
Table 5. Sources and Primary Mechanisms of Circadian Rhythm 

























(e.g., shift work, 
social jetlag, early 
school start times) 
✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ ✖ 











✔ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Senescence ✖ ✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ 




✖ ✖ ✖ ✔ ✔ 
 
The nature of naval maritime operations often requires Sailors to engage in 
shiftwork (i.e., work outside of the typical daytime working hours of 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.). This 
phenomenon often results in disruptions to the normal circadian rhythm, or circadian 
desynchrony. Meanwhile, circadian misalignment can occur when an individual sleeps 
during the biological “day” instead of “night” (Shattuck et al., 2018). Sailors working 
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onboard ships often experience circadian desynchronization and misalignment due to 
limited sleep opportunities, long workdays, and exposure to artificial or natural light during 
circadian inappropriate times (Miller & Eddy, 2008; Mysliwiec et al., 2016). Table 2 details 
additional sources which contribute to disrupted circadian rhythms. 
3. Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) 
The Fatigue Avoidance Scheduling Tool (FAST) is a Windows-based program that 
is based upon the SAFTE Model. Planners and schedulers can use the FAST program to 
approximate the effects of a variety of schedules on human performance. Work and sleep 
activity data can be entered in graphic or text-based formats. The user can create several 
work schedules through this interface where work periods are shown as red bands and sleep 
periods are depicted as blue bands (Figure 13). The average predicted effectiveness for a 
given work period may be extracted and printed as shown in the table in Figure 14. The 
information from FAST can then be applied to hypothetical, future work schedules to 
pinpoint potential performance problems and to enhance operational planning and 
scheduling (Hursh et al., 2004). Moreover, it can be used to examine retrospective data 
such as sleep patterns of individuals involved in mishaps.  
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Figure 13. Sample of FAST Work Schedule. Source: AFRL (2003). 
 
Figure 14. Sample of FAST Work Schedule Output. Source: AFRL 
(2003). 
Previous studies on alternate schedules onboard warships assessed the relationship 
between watch rotations and associated levels of fatigue and performance (Yokeley, 2012; 
Roberts, 2012; Young, 2013; Kerno, 2014; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014). An illustrative 
comparison between a 3/9 versus a 5/10 watch rotation on FAST is provided in Figure 15 
which depicts improved predicted effectiveness and blood alcohol equivalence percentages 
associated with the 3/9 watch rotation. The percent effectiveness is displayed on the left 
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and the blood alcohol equivalence percentage is displayed on the right from Figure 15. One 
of the outcomes from the previous fatigue and work/rest cycle theses eventually resulted 
in the adoption of circadian rhythm-based watch rotations through the implementation of 
the CFEMP in 2017 (DON, 2017a).  
 
Figure 15. FAST Output Based on 3/9 and 5/10 Watch Rotations. 
Source: Crew Endurance Handbook (2017). 
A previous study of the work/rest patterns of Sailors onboard the USS Rentz (FFG-
46) compared data from daily activity logs and wrist activity monitors to NSWW hours 
and found that the hours worked by many participants were above NSWW limits (Green, 
2009). Figure 16 is a sample of one participant’s FAST data from the study. Participant 
5318 scored an overall effectiveness of 68.76% for the duration of the study and in one 
instance, their predictive effectiveness score dipped to 26% (Figure 16). As Participant 
5318’s sleep time decreased, the associated predicted effectiveness score also decreased 
from 90% to 48% during a five-day underway period (Green, 2009). Of interest are the red 
flags towards the bottom of Figure 14 which display the following alerts (1) Percent Sleep, 
(2) Chronic Debt, (3) Hours Awake, and (4) Time of Day which contributed to Participant 
5318’s low predicted effectiveness score at 1:33 a.m. on May 19, 2009. 
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Figure 16. Participant 5318’s FAST Analysis Result. Source: Green 
(2009). 
FAST shares many of the limitations mentioned in the SAFTE section since it is 
based on that model. While the FAST interface and application have undergone several 
updates to improve its accuracy, capability, and usability, there is still room for 
improvement. Some improvements include added features to “allow users to adjust sleep 
environments, display shifts in time zones, and analyze the effects of sleep aides on 
performance” (Brown, 2012, p. 14). Currently, FAST users do not have the ability to adjust 
for variations in working environments, specifically maritime environments, which may 
result in inaccurate predicted effectiveness values. According to Heus and colleagues 
(1998), there are varying levels of energy expenditure associated with the muscular effort 
required to maintain one’s balance while working on a pitching or rolling surface compared 
to working on a stable surface. While the motion effect will vary due to the stability of a 
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ship platform and weather conditions, more work is required to account for how motion 
affects fatigue levels onboard ships.  
In Lieutenant Brown’s 2012 thesis, she used FAST to assess the performance of 21 
volunteers during in port and at-sea conditions with varying sea state levels. One of her 
findings was that increased motion on maritime platforms contributes to a reduction in 
sleep quality and higher levels of perceived fatigue (Brown, 2012), which supported 
outcomes from previous studies (Calhoun, 2006; Sullivan, 2009). Lieutenant Brown also 
evaluated FAST for application within the maritime workplace and found that it 
inadequately predicted performance by overestimating the effects of poor sleep quality on 
performance during the study (Brown, 2012). One of Lieutenant Brown’s 
recommendations was to further refine the SAFTE model by exploring how the maritime 
domain affects sleep reservoir replenishment and its components to adequately account for 
the long-term disjointed sleep typically seen in the operational maritime environment 
(Brown, 2012). 
4. FlyAwake 
In 2009, Lieutenant Beshany conducted a comparative analysis of U.S. Navy flight 
schedules using FAST and a related software tool, FlyAwake. FlyAwake is a software 
application developed by the U.S. Air Force that reverse-engineered the SAFTE model. 
FlyAwake calculates predicted effectiveness based on user inputs, such as crewmembers’ 
sleep and duty cycles, much like FAST since they are both based on the SAFTE model 
(Beshany, 2009). Some advantages of using FlyAwake vice FAST were the reduced 
workload requirements for schedulers since the program was tailored for use with the 
military aviation community in mind. FlyAwake had an updated graphical user interface 
(GUI), pre-populated data-specific fields such as missions and duties based on the 
squadron’s Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) of aircraft, and default settings for “mission brief, 
launch, recovery, and debrief times” (Beshany, 2009, p. 22). A screenshot of the 
FlyAwake’s work schedule builder is available in Figure 17.  
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Figure 17. FlyAwake Work Schedule Builder Screenshot. Source: 
Beshany (2009). 
One of the objectives from Lieutenant Beshany’s study was to provide a statistically 
valid proof of concept for the integration of FlyAwake’s fatigue prediction functionality 
into the existing flight scheduling tool, U.S. Navy Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness 
Program (SHARP). Based on the historical flight schedules from Helicopter 
Antisubmarine Squadron Light Four Two’s (HSL-42) SHARP database, Lieutenant 
Beshany was able to compare the outputs of FlyAwake and FAST and concluded that 
FlyAwake provided comparable fatigue mitigation recommendations (Figure 18) to 
schedulers (Beshany, 2009). In 2009, Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) directed the 
creators of SHARP and FlyAwake, Inova Systems and MacroSystems, respectively, to 
integrate the functionality of FlyAwake with SHARP and to disseminate the product to 
select squadrons for usability testing by October 2009 (Beshany, 2009). The results from 
this integration and testing are currently unknown. As of 2020, the FlyAwake functionality 
within SHARP is not widely used or available. Incorporation of the fatigue prediction 
functionality of FlyAwake with the flight scheduling functionality of SHARP may enhance 




Figure 18. FlyAwake Graphical Output Screenshot. Source: Beshany 
(2009). 
5. Optimized Watchbill and Logistics Fatigue Meter (OWL FM) 
The Optimized Watchbill and Logistics Fatigue Meter (OWL FM) application was 
designed to support watchbill scheduling and watchbill fatigue assessments with a 
dashboard that supports fatigue analysis (Mollicone & Bruneau, 2018). The calculated 
fatigue scores are from a biomathematical model described by McCauley and colleagues 
(2009) which incorporates information about an individual’s approximated sleep history 
and an offset to account for time zone shifts (Mollicone & Bruneau, 2018). The fatigue 
model was also calibrated with validated data from a variety of operational and laboratory 
studies to cover a wide range of situations a person may experience in a submarine 
environment. The following parameters are incorporated into the model’s fatigue score 
calculation: total or partial sleep deprivation, presence of naps, shift work, night work, and 
partial sleep deprivation episodes followed by sleep recovery periods (Mollicone & 
Bruneau, 2018).  
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Funded by the Office of Naval Research and with the assistance of the Naval 
Submarine Medical Research Laboratory (NSMRL), Pulsar Informatics created this tool to 
detect and prevent high fatigue risk situations and provide near real time fatigue monitoring 
throughout an operational day (Mollicone & Bruneau, 2018). The calculated fatigue scores 
for the unit are linked to performance lapses on the Psychomotor Vigilance Test (PVT) 
which measures behavioral alertness during a 10-minute reaction time task (Lim & Dinges, 
2008). As a reference, eight hours of sleep per night is associated with a predicted daytime 
average of 4.6 PVT lapses; however, after a 24-hour awake period, the number of PVT 
lapses jumps to 16.5. These lapses are an important objective measure of performance 
because they have been correlated to higher operational error rates in a variety of safety 
sensitive environments like the transportation and railroad industry (Mollicone et al., 2019; 
Hursh et al., 2011).  
OWL FM reportedly provides predicted fatigue scores for individuals based on 
their duty periods, depicted as gray bars, and sleep estimates, depicted as blue bars (Figure 
19). Throughout the application’s dashboard, relevant information like a crewmember’s 
average number of duty events, average sleep hours, average fatigue levels, and average 
fatigue scores are clearly displayed on the top right-hand corner for easy viewing (Figure 
19). The application also allows users to perform fatigue monitoring and trend analysis as 
illustrated in Figures 20 and 21 which provides schedulers with critical feedback to identify 
and mitigate fatigue risk through proactive scheduling. Additional images of the OWL FM 
dashboard are included in the figures in Appendix C. The results from this integration and 
testing are currently unknown. These dashboard views make it easy for users to spot 
dangerous fatigue trends at the unit or individual level to implement fatigue mitigation 
actions. Since the system maintains historical data for an individual, the warning thresholds 
can be adjusted to a specific person’s work and rest patterns instead of using group 
averages. The retention of historical data could be an extremely useful function for future 
analysis since the effect of fatigue factors and the amount of required sleep can vary 
between individuals.  
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Crew member duty periods are represented by gray bars and the corresponding sleep period 
estimates are represented by blue bars. The fatigue scores are listed on the right-hand side. 
Figure 19. Crew Member Duty Periods and Sleep Estimates with 
Corresponding Fatigue Scores. Source: Mollicone and Bruneau 
(2018). 
The OWL FM application allows users to focus on specific times when a person 
may have exceeded an absolute threshold or when their fatigue score deviates above their 
average personal range. The preliminary values for an absolute threshold and fatigue score 
deviation may be chosen based on benchmarks such as the number of PVT lapses (e.g., 
highlight when the number of PVT lapses are greater than 12) or a particular sleep 
deprivation situation (e.g., if a person experiences fatigue comparable to 24 hours of total 
sleep deprivation). Thresholds may also be adjusted after the initial period of use, and 
periodically thereafter, based on the observed fatigue score distribution (Mollicone & 
Bruneau, 2018).  
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Crew members exhibiting elevated fatigue levels are highlighted in orange and the members 
exhibiting excessive fatigue levels are highlighted in red.  
Figure 20. Heat Map of Crew Member Fatigue Levels Grouped by 
Organizational Level. Source: Mollicone and Bruneau (2018). 
 
Figure 21. List of Crew Members Sorted by Fatigue Level. Source: 
Mollicone and Bruneau (2018). 
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Software applications like FAST, FlyAwake, and OWL FM have been used in 
various military environments to estimate the fatigue risk associated with an individual’s 
work and sleep schedule. While these tools offer users valuable fatigue management 
insight, extensive study is still required to validate the proffered performance measures 
against the actual performance of Sailors within the military maritime domain. Of 
particular interest is how to tailor the algorithms for these applications to appropriately 
account for the effects of sleep fragmentation, circadian variations, time zone shifts, 
shiftwork, around the clock performance, and sub-optimal sleep schedules and quality – all 
of which are commonplace onboard U.S. warships (Shattuck et al., 2014; Shattuck & 
Matsangas, 2016). 
Existing applications and models are not specifically tailored for use in the military 
maritime environment. Accounting for unique occurrences like shipboard motion causing 
decreased sleep quality and increased levels of perceived fatigue (Brown, 2012; Grow & 
Sullivan, 2009) and the use of alternative watch schedules (Shattuck & Matsangas, 2014; 
Young, 2013; Roberts, 2012; Yokeley, 2012) would reduce the instances of over-
estimation or under-estimation of fatigue or readiness levels. Further research into how 
sleep, fatigue, and performance may differ based on a Sailor’s organizational level and 
watch rotation (Kerno, 2014) may also result in more useful and accurate predictive values 
of Sailor performance in military maritime operational settings. 
E. SHIPBOARD WATCHBILLS AND PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS 
The following section will go over the watch organization onboard U.S. Navy 
warships, watchbills, data repositories used for watchbill creation, and personnel 
scheduling considerations. 
1. U.S. Navy Watch Organization and Watchbills 
Chapter 4 of the Standard Organization and Regulations of the U.S. Navy (SORM) 
instruction outlines the watch organization and composition based on the range of 
operations that are characteristic of naval warfare. A watch is defined as “any period of 
time during which a Sailor is assigned specific, detailed responsibilities on a recurring 
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basis”; furthermore, ships must set watches for both in port and underway conditions 
(DON, 2017c, p. 4-1, para. 2). The instruction also outlines the specific watch stations 
which must be manned in port and underway, the basic function of the watchstander, 
associated duties, responsibilities, and authority, and organizational relationships with 
other watchstanders. Standard U.S. Navy watches may be structured as follows: 0000–
0400 (Mid Watch), 0400–0800 (Morning Watch), 0800–1200 (Forenoon Watch), 1200–
1600 (Afternoon Watch), 1600–1800 (First dog Watch), 1800–2000 (Second dog Watch), 
and 2200–0000 (Evening Watch) (DON, 2017c, p. 4-7). While ships may follow different 
watch rotation structures, the requirement to man certain watch stations for 24-hour 
operational coverage is an important requirement for creating watchbills and is partially 
dictated by the ship’s readiness condition (Table 6).  
Table 6. Navy Readiness Conditions. Adapted from Fletcher (2018).  
Condition Name Description 
I Battle Readiness or 
General Quarters 
All battle stations are fully manned in preparation 
for combat situations or emergencies. The crew is 
expected to be able to maintain this posture for 24 
continuous hours. 
II Modified Battle 
Readiness 
A modified Condition I readiness state set to meet 
increased battle readiness requirements for a 
warfare area or areas. The crew is expected to be 
able to maintain this posture for 10 days. 





Typical posture for deployed ships where watches 
are manned to defend against pop-up threats.  
The crew is expected to sustain this posture for 60 
days or fewer. 
IV Peacetime Training 
Cruising Readiness 
Lowest underway readiness posture associated 
with reduced watch station manning requirements. 
The crew must be prepared to step through the 
higher readiness conditions as required.  




2. Watch Organization and Personnel Scheduling Challenges  
There are several factors and constraints schedulers must consider when making a 
watchbill. A more comprehensive list is available in the concept map located in Appendix 
B. Previous messages from Naval Surface Forces Commanders encouraged the adoption 
of alternative watch schedules and the promotion of better exercise, nutrition, and sleep 
practices to address crew endurance issues (Naval Surface Forces [NSF], 2013; NSF, 
2016). While these recommendations were encouraged, not all commands were able to 
fully incorporate them into their organization. The policy constraint and how it interacts 
with the other factors and constraints is of interest in the watchbill and personnel 
scheduling problem (Figure 22) because it establishes another requirement with which 
schedulers and COs must comply. One key development since the Comprehensive Review 
of 2017 was the release of Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(COMNAVSURFPAC) and Commander, Naval Surface Force Atlantic’s 
(COMNAVSURFLANT) Comprehensive Fatigue and Endurance Management Policy (or 
CFEMP) on November 30, 2017. This policy marked a major cultural shift for naval 
surface forces and a stronger commitment to addressing crew endurance issues which have 
plagued the Navy for decades. With the desired end state of ensuring that “Sailors are 
adequately rested for safe, professional shipboard operations to deliver enhanced 
warfighting effectiveness,” the policy established crew rest requirements, workday limits, 
crew endurance training, and fatigue mitigation steps for the surface navy (DON, 2017a, 
p. 1, para. 3).  
42 
 
Figure 22. Partial Concept Map of Commanding Officer Scheduling 
Considerations and Constraints. Source: Brown (n.d.) 
Currently, ship COs are required to make go/no-go decisions based on the following 
fatigue management policy (DON, 2017b):  
(1) Under ordinary circumstances underway, Sailors should receive a 
minimum of 7 hours of sleep in a 24-hour day; either by one uninterrupted 
7-hour period or an uninterrupted 5-hour period with an uninterrupted 2-
hour nap. Each of these notional watch rotations and shipboard routines 
presented in [the Naval Postgraduate School Crew Endurance Handbook 
v1.1, 1 Oct 2017], meet these guidelines. 
 
(2) [The U.S. Coast Guard Crew Endurance Management Practices, Jan 
2003] recommends that Sailor workdays not exceed 12 hours in a 24-hour 
period or 8 continuous hours of work. Per [the Naval Air Training and 
Operating Procedures  Standardization (NATOPS) General Flight and 
Operating Instructions Manual, CNAF M-3710.7, 15 Jul 2017], as the time 
continuously awake exceeds 16 hours, performance begins to drop. After 
18 hours, performance efficiency rapidly declines to 75% of effectiveness 
or less, and accident rates increase for almost every activity. (p. 2) 
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At present, no standardized method exists for commanding officers to account for 
a Sailor’s hours to ensure compliance with this instruction. The Individual Risk 
Management Tool (IRMT) included as an enclosure to the fatigue management policy must 
be included as a “part of operational risk management in both routine operations, as well 
as special evolutions briefings” (DON, 2017a, p. 3, para. 2). This process requires an 
accounting of the “proficiency, currency, and fatigue level of key watchstanders” as well 
as the status of key equipment and the weather in preparation for conducting operational 
evolutions (DON, 2017a, p. 3, para. 2).  
The categories for the IRMT are as follows: watch/rest, experience, weather, and 
equipment. The human-related values of the “watch to rest ratio” and “experience,” as 
outlined in Figures 23 and 24, are directly related to a Sailor’s schedule. A Sailor’s watch 
to rest ratio is based on their sleep and watch activity hours while their experience rating 
comes from hours spent on watch or participating in training. The values from each 
category make up the Individual Risk Management (IRM) score which is associated with 
the following risk ratings: 8 is critical, 8–10 is serious, 11–13 is moderate, 13–14 is minor, 
and 15–16 is negligible. After the rating process is complete, the final score influences 
whether the CO makes a go/no-go decision for an operational evolution like an underway 
replenishment (DON, 2017a). A completed sample IRMT is available in Appendix D. 
There are some overlapping values which allow for subjective risk assessments when COs 
balance other operational and mission tasking considerations.  
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Figure 23. Watch to Rest Ratio (left) Rating Scale from the Individual 
Risk Management Tool. Source: DON (2017a). 
 
Figure 24. Watch Experience (right) Rating Scale from the Individual 
Risk Management Tool. Source: DON (2017a). 
Without an objective way to assess the watch-to-rest ratio rating from Figures 23 
and 24, the CO and schedulers are left to accept watchstanders’ self-reported sleep 
estimates which may not be accurate. The fatigue models previously presented also 
determined that there are more factors that influence fatigue outside of how much sleep a 
person received in the past 24 hours. The surface navy requires a more holistic and 
standardized way to model fatigue for their Sailors to reduce the operational risk associated 
with fatigue and sleep deprivation. 
3. Data Repositories for Scheduling Considerations 
The growing manning shortfall, at 9,000 unfilled ship billets, poses a large problem 
for future force readiness and continues to be a major scheduling consideration (Larter, 
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2020). The large gap of unfilled sea-going billets, up from 2,750 from 2019 (Larter, 2020), 
have significant downstream effects such as limiting the number of available watch 
standers and workers onboard USN ships.  
a. Navy Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS)  
According to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & 
Acquisition webpage, the Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) is an 
“information system for the management of supply, maintenance, and personnel 
administration for ships, submarines, aviation squadrons, and intermediate maintenance 
activities” (para. 3). Table 7 contains a brief description and status of the various NTCSS 
applications. Of interest are the Organizational Maintenance Management System – Next 
Generation (OMMS-NG) and the Relational Administration Data Management (RADM) 
applications which contain information about how Sailors are employed. The OMMS-NG 
application is used to “plan, schedule, report, and track maintenance actions [and] 
interfaces with shore activities to provide them with configuration, maintenance, and 
logistics information they require to support the fleet” (Arbulu, 2007, pp. 46). Although 
the system does not provide a sequenced accounting for individual manhours, it does record 
information such as the number of maintenance hours required to perform corrective 
maintenance and severity of the impact of space and system degradations which are 
captured under Job Sequence Numbers (JSNs). This information contributes to the 
aggregate metrics regarding workhours from maintenance, but it is associated with spaces, 
systems, divisions, and work centers which make fatigue tracking and risk management for 
individuals challenging.
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Table 7. NTCSS Applications and Descriptions. Adapted from GAO 
(2005).  
NTCSS 
Applications Description Status 
Relational Supply 
(R-Supply) 
Supports supply chain management, 
inventory management, and financial 
management processes. Provides Navy 
personnel with access to the supply support 
functions they perform most often—
ordering, receiving, and issuing necessary 
supplies and materials; maintaining financial 
records; and reconciling supply, inventory, 
and financial records with the Navy’s shore 
infrastructure 
Operational, as of 
September 1998, on 
large force-level ships, 
smaller unit-level 
ships, and at air 







System – Next 
Generation 
(OMMS-NG) 
Assists shipboard personnel in planning, 
scheduling, reporting, and tracking 
maintenance and related logistics support 
actions. Maintains online lists of 
maintenance actions to be performed, parts 
required to maintain shipboard equipment, 
and parts carried onboard ship to support 
maintenance actions. Interfaces with 
Relational Supply to requisition parts that 
are not onboard. 
Operational, as of 
September 1998, 
primarily on large 








Automates the management of personnel 
awards and decorations, work assignments, 
and berthing assignments. 
 
Operational, as of 
April 2000, on large 
force-level ships, 
smaller unit-level 
ships, and at air 







Provides online intermediate-level aviation 
maintenance, configuration, and logistics 
management support. Interfaces with other 
major integrated logistics support systems 
within the Naval aviation community. 
Operational, as of 
April 2000, at force-
level ships and at air 






The RADM application serves as the afloat personnel management system and was 
designed to automate several functions such as personnel awards and decorations 
management, work assignments, and berthing assignments. Users can perform various 
functions including, but not limited to, creating muster reports, updating training records, 
tracking qualification data, and building watchbills. A Sailor’s qualification data, or the 
completion of Personnel Qualification Standards (PQSs) and Job Qualification 
Requirements (JQRs), directly inform the personnel scheduling process. While RADM 
retains a historical record of watchbills which associate individual Sailors with their 
assigned watches, it is common practice to overwrite these watchbills which results in the 
loss of previous versions. Unless the scheduler has historical copies of the watchbills, 
another system in place to track a Sailor’s watch, or an impeccable memory, this 
information is typically not retained or accounted for when the time comes to draft the next 
watchbill.  
The muster section within RADM allows schedulers to mark whether a Sailor is 
present or accounted for that will affect the scheduler’s ability to assign a Sailor a watch. 
A Sailor’s watch status can only be recorded for ship’s company or for personnel attached 
to the ship (e.g., individual augmentees, ship riders, temporarily assigned individuals, 
aircrew detachments, etc.). If a Sailor is on leave, liberty, Sick in Quarters (SIQ), or on 
Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) status, the start and end time must be entered. When 
overlapping times cause a logical conflict in the system, the user will receive a notification 
to either modify the start and end times or confirm their muster accounting choice before 
they can proceed with scheduling. These alerts are designed to prevent schedulers from 
inadvertently assigning watches to non-available personnel; however, the process is not 
infallible. If the alerts are disregarded or the incorrect accountability information is entered, 
a non-available Sailor may accidentally be scheduled for watch.  
The training tab within RADM captures the type and time related to certain training 
modules and sessions for Sailors. Training data from RADM interfaces with the Fleet 
Training Management Planning System (FLTMPS) when the afloat and the ashore servers 
update (Arbulu, 2007). The training data does not provide an hourly accounting of when 
an individual participated in training and may not provide training duration in certain cases. 
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The qualifications section of the application can track progress made on PQSs and JQRs, 
provide tentative goals for completion, and retain the associated qualification statuses and 
data. One advantage of the RADM application is that it contains software logic which will 
not allow a scheduler to assign a Sailor for watch unless the Sailor is designated as 
Qualified (Q), Under Instruction (U/I), or Interim Qualified (I). This prevents the 
inadvertent assignment of someone who is not qualified to stand the watch. 
The personnel assignment process can be labor intensive, especially when one must 
create a watchbill and perform the watch station and PQS/JQR associations from scratch. 
The tentative qualification dates associated with assigning Sailors PQSs and JQRs do not 
automatically translate to any future planning considerations within the application for 
watchbill making purposes. Division officers and warfare area leads tasked with creating 
quarterly Watch Team Replacement Plans (WTRPs) must transfer the existing information 
from this database manually to show qualification progression for their personnel. While 
the start dates for qualification deadlines are adjustable in the system, the duration of the 
qualification timeline is fixed. This rigid structure fails to account for numerous, often 
concurrent, PQS assignments and increased workloads. Additionally, the GUI can be 
difficult to work with and the application itself is subject to long lag times, freezing, 
overwriting existing files, or failing to save watchbill changes.  
Anecdotal reports claim that NTCSS, to include RADM, will be phased out soon, 
meaning that it is subject to expiration unless it is renewed. A Government Accountability 
Report (GAO) from 2005 called for the reassessment of future investment into NTCSS due 
to the Navy’s mismanagement of the program. The GAO recommended increased scrutiny 
into the program to determine if it was a “prudent use of limited resources” due to the lack 
of economic justification for re-investment, inability to make the program follow the “well-
defined DOD or Navy enterprise architecture,” absence of key measurement, reporting, 
budgeting and oversight activities, and inadequate requirements management and testing 
activities (GAO, 2005). 
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b. SKED 3.2 
SKED 3.2 is a Maintenance and Material Management (3M) scheduling tool 
utilized onboard ships to manage organizational level maintenance through the completion 
of Planned Maintenance System (PMS) checks (Sponseller, 2019). The PMS schedules can 
fall under the following categories: cycle, quarterly, and weekly. The schedules are then 
populated with maintenance based on the periodicity codes listed on the Maintenance 
Requirement Cards (MRCs) (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2015). A list of periodicity 
codes is provided in Table 8. 
Table 8. Periodicity Codes Associated with the Planned Maintenance 
System. Adapted from NAVSEAINST 4790.8C (2015).  
Calendar Periodicity Codes 
Periodicity Date Range 
D – Daily None 
2D – Every 2 days None 
3D – Every 3 days None 
W - Weekly None 
2W – Every 2 weeks 9-19 days 
3W – Every 3 weeks 14-28 days 
M - Monthly 21-41 days 
2M – Every 2 months 41-83 days 
Q - Quarterly 61-121 days 
4M – Every 4 months 83-165 days 
S – Semi-annually 121-243 days 
8M – Every 8 months 165-331 days 
9M – Every 9 months ± 90 days from scheduled date 
A - Annually ± 90 days from scheduled date 
xM – Every x months where x = # of months ± 90 days from scheduled date 
Non-Calendar Periodicity Codes 
R – Situational Requirement  
U – Unscheduled Maintenance  
AP – Assessment Procedure  
Inactive Equipment Maintenance (IEM) Codes 
LU – Lay-Up  
PM – Periodic Maintenance  
SU – Start-Up  
OT = Operational Test  
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The Work Center Supervisor (WCS) can create a maintenance schedule in SKED 
3.2 for specified periods, which is then approved by the divisional and departmental chain 
of command. The scheduler, or the WCS, can assign qualified personnel on specific days 
to complete the required scheduled maintenance checks. This system accounts for the 
manhours a Sailor spends on performing organizational level maintenance, but it does not 
have an hourly accounting of their time and it does not take credit for corrective 
maintenance associated with unplanned equipment failure. Moreover, this method may not 
accurately account for a Sailor’s maintenance workload if they are assigned to complete a 
check that requires more than one maintenance person since the maintenance hours 
involved are subsumed by the more senior or experienced maintenance person. The 3M 
manual requires that the more senior or more knowledgeable maintenance person take 
credit for the check.  
c. Plan of the Day (POD) and Plan of the Week (POW) 
The Plan of the Day (POD) and Plan of the Week (POW) provide an overview of 
the day’s or week’s events which affect a Sailor’s schedule. Events like cleaning stations 
and sweepers are often all-hands events while certain events like training, working parties, 
and meetings may only affect a handful of people. The information contained within these 
documents is usually not associated with individual Sailors unless it is for a high visibility 
item like checking-in/out with members of the triad composed of the Commanding Officer 
(CO), Executive Officer (XO), and Command Master Chief (CMC). Some scheduled 
events from these sources require a Sailor to change their existing work/rest schedule for 
various planned (e.g., freshwater wash down) and unplanned evolutions (e.g., shifted 
underway replenishment). A Sailor may have to adapt to this scheduling information by 
switching watches or procuring a watch relief, which may result in sleep loss or a 
disadvantageous shift in their circadian rhythm.  
In summary, vigilant warfighters are necessary to carry out essential mission 
tasking and to safeguard the nation’s interests. Excessive wakefulness, limited sleep/rest 
opportunities (Shattuck et al., 2018), and ever-increasing requirements and workloads 
(Fletcher, 2018) place an undue burden on Sailors which diminishes their performance and 
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threatens mission effectiveness. The U.S. Navy must continue leveraging knowledge about 
human performance risk factors into their everyday operations to improve crew endurance, 
warfighter performance, operational effectiveness, and safety. Left unchecked, the 
confluence of lapses in judgment, reduced vigilance, impaired reaction times, and degraded 
decision-making increase operational risk and pose a critical safety risk to Sailors and 
crews throughout the fleet. An alert watchstander could mean the difference in avoiding a 
collision, properly executing casualty control actions, or identifying and neutralizing an 
incoming threat. In an environment where seconds count and attention to detail matters, 
investing in Sailors to ensure they are resilient and ready for tasking could pay dividends 
in preventing loss of life or damage to the ship.  
  
52 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
53 
III. APPROACH IN PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
While the 2017 CFEMP established work and rest hour guidelines and mandated 
circadian-based watchbills (DON, 2017a), the U.S. Navy lacks a standardized and holistic 
way to manage Sailors’ work and rest patterns. The absence of a systematic way to collect 
this data presents a large knowledge gap and a missed opportunity to optimize work 
schedules, improve crew resource management, and gain insight on fatigue risk indicators. 
Fatigue risk indicators such as prolonged wakefulness and insufficient sleep are associated 
with increased human performance risks which can lead to major accidents during naval 
operations. To improve crew endurance, warfighter performance, and operational 
effectiveness and safety, the U.S. Navy must invest in fatigue management tools and 
methods tailored to the military maritime environment. The following chapter presents a 
conceptual design overview, development rationale and information, and a functionality 
assessment for the SMART prototype. This chapter also describes the data created, 
analytical approach, and assumptions of the model underlying the decision aid.  
A. PROTOTYPE CONCEPTUAL DESIGN  
The main objective of this thesis is to create a scheduling decision aid prototype in 
MS Excel capable of tracking work and rest activity data for USN crewmembers. The 
output of the prototype provides a data-driven way to assess work/rest schedules, enhance 
crew resource management, and mitigate human performance risk related to fatigue. Figure 
25 contains an overview of the inputs, constraints and limitations, and outputs of the 
SMART prototype. The main inputs are the activity information categorized as watch (W), 
work (A), maintenance (M), and sleep/rest (S) hours, in blue, for crew members (Figure 
25). The main outputs are the graphical displays and reports, in orange, which provide 




Figure 25. SMART Prototype Concept Map 
The SMART prototype contains two databases, one for personnel and one for 
work/rest activity. Figure 26 outlines the data entry process which begins with the entry of 
the crew member names and their organizational associations (e.g., Department, Division) 
in the Crew List tab. The Activity Entry tab is automatically populated with the personnel 
data from the Crew List tab which enables users to enter the individuals’ watch and work 
times within a given day. Additional days for the same individual are added in the same 
tab. The activity data from the Activity Entry tab automatically populates the respective 
15-minute time blocks in the Activity Timeline tab. Users can verify and revise the watch 
and working hours in the Activity Timeline tab. Additionally, users can enter sleep/rest and 
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maintenance activity in the Activity Timeline tab. The Activity Timeline also allows the 
user to filter the data to display the activity distribution by organizational level, date, or 
select crew members. Of note, the day ends at 23:45 to keep the 15-minute tracking pattern. 
 
Bold text indicates required user inputs and regular text indicates optional data entry fields. 
Figure 26. Diagram of Data Entry Process 
After the data entry is completed, the SMART prototype automatically calculates 
descriptive statistics based on the human performance risk metrics listed in the Activity 
Thresholds tab. Descriptive statistics such as average working hours and average sleep/rest 














•Number of Watch Sections
Activity Timeline
•Verify/ Edit Watch (W) and Work (A) hours
•Add Sleep/Rest hours (S)
•Add Maintenance hours (M)
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management decisions and forms the foundation for the various dashboards within the 
prototype.  
B. PROTOTYPE DEVELOPMENT 
This section contains development notes, database attribute details, and data 
associations for the prototype. To accomplish the main objective of this thesis, SMART 
must have the following attributes: 
1. Data Structure 
a. Contains a list of crew members and their associated occupational 
information (e.g., organizational affiliation) to produce graphical 
outputs and enable targeted (i.e., individual or organizational level) 
crew resource management actions. 
b. Enables additions, deletions, or modifications to the crew list to 
accommodate changes resulting from personnel transfers or crew 
augments. 
c. Records multiple 24-hour periods of work and rest activity data for each 
crew member for systematic data collection and processing to enable 
trend analysis.  
2. Data Processing and Handling 
a. Automatically carries over the information from the personnel and 
activity databases for processing to reduce the user’s data entry time. 
b. Delineates required and optional data fields to reduce the user’s data 
entry time and administrative burden.  
c. Accounts for data gaps or missing entries. 
d. Automatically calculates summary statistics for work (e.g., watch, 
work, and maintenance) and rest activity data at different organizational 
levels (e.g., individual, division, department, and command) to produce 
graphical outputs and reports. 
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3. Data Outputs 
a. Work/rest activity summary reports sorted by organizational level for 
trend analysis. 
b. Average activity levels sorted by organizational level to assist with crew 
resource management (e.g., personnel selection and work schedule 
management) 
c. Lists the critical and serious risk crew members to provide users with 
human performance risk insight. The information is designed to assist 
with personnel selection. 
1. Prototype Organizational Structure 
The SMART workbook contains several tabs. The Overview tab in the workbook 
contains summary information (e.g., name, purpose and available functions, and user 
notes) for the available tabs. Each tab name in the directory is directly linked to the 
associated tab for ease of navigation. The tabs visible to the user are marked in blue, and 
the hidden, developer tabs are marked in red (Table 9). The developer tabs within the 
prototype contain pivot tables that are linked with the outputs displayed in the three 
dashboards (Table 9). The pivot tables were hidden to reduce the display of redundant 
information and reduce the likelihood of formatting changes or errors to the dashboard 
outputs. More detailed information regarding the technical aspects of the prototype (e.g., 
formatting structure, formulas, etc.), operator instructions, and troubleshooting steps are 







Table 9. Organizational Structure of the SMART Prototype  
Tabs visible to the user are shown in blue, and hidden developer tabs are show in red. 
Tab Function(s) 
Overview Provides a navigational pane and overview of the available 
functions. 
Crew List Contains a list of all personnel along with their associated 
Department, Division, and Rank/Rate. This information will feed 
into the functionality of other tabs in the prototype. 
Activity Entry Allows users to enter an activity (e.g., watch and work) hours.  
Activity Timeline Allows users to verify and edit watch and work activity information. 
The user can also enter maintenance and sleep/rest activity.  
Activity Summary Contains summarized information for activity hours. Allows users to 
enter activity thresholds for assessment of human performance risk. 
Threshold Values Displays the activity threshold limits, associated risk assessment 
values, and concern level ratings. The user can modify the activity 
threshold limits in this tab.  
Average Activity 
Dashboard 
Provides graphical displays for activity averages (e.g., total work, 
watch, sleep/rest, and maintenance). 
Risk Level List 
Dashboard 
Provides a list of all personnel by risk level category (e.g., minor, 
moderate, serious, or critical). 
Risk Level Charts 
Dashboard 
Provides graphical displays sorted by risk level category (e.g., minor, 




Contains the pivot tables for the activity averages graphics sorted by 




Contains the pivot tables for the activity averages trend graphic 
utilized in the Average Activity Dashboard tab.  
Risk Charts Contains the pivot tables for the risk level graphics utilized in the 
Risk Charts Dashboard tab.  
Validation Provides drop down item selections to aid in data validation. 
Demographics Provides demographic graphics from the Crew List tab. 
 
2. Crew List Tab  
The personnel database is contained in the Crew List tab and is formatted as a table 
to facilitate future development and ease of summary statistic tabulation. Table 10 details 
the field names, data types, and data descriptions for the entry fields in the Crew List tab. 
The Department, Division, and Class entry fields are data-validated and the selection 
options are tailored for a Cruiser or Destroyer ship type organizational structure.  
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Table 10. Crew List Tab Field Names and Attributes  
Bold field names are required SMART prototype inputs. 
Field Name Data Type Data Description 
Department Text Department abbreviation 
Division Text Division abbreviation 
Rank/Rate Text Rank (Officer)/ Rate (Enlisted) abbreviation 
Name Text First and last name  
Job Title Text Primary billet title 
Class Text Officer or Enlisted classification 
Projected Rotation Date 
(PRD) 
Date/Time Local date/time (minimum of month and year) 
 
3. Activity Database 
The Activity Database is comprised of the Activity Entry, Activity Timeline, and 
Activity Summary tabs. The method for collecting activity information for the SMART 
prototype was inspired by several sources. Previous NPS theses on U.S. Navy Sailor work 
and rest activity patterns utilized activity logs alongside wrist-worn actigraphy, surveys, 
and questionnaire data. Civilian mariners use several commercially available software 
applications to track work/rest activity.  
The Activity Entry, Activity Timeline, and Activity Summary tabs were designed 
to automatically populate with Department, Division, Rank/Rate, and Name data points 
from the Crew List tab. This function was designed to reduce the administrative burden on 
the user by eliminating the need to enter redundant information. The Activity Entry tab was 
designed to transfer data typically contained in a watchbill in a centralized location (Table 
11). The watches were separated into two blocks because watchstanders commonly stand 
two watches during a 24-hour period. Working hours were meant to capture the 
individual’s normal working hours (e.g., 0600 to 1600). Additional watch or work hours 
can be manually added under the Activity Timeline tab as required. While users can utilize 
additional or alternative activity codes like “T” for training, they will not be tabulated in 
the Activity Summary table without additional programming changes. Additionally, the 
outputs will not reflect activities outside of the pre-programmed activity codes.  
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Table 11. Activity Entry Tab Field Names and Attributes  
Field Name Data Type Data Description 
Date Date/Time Formatted as MM/DD/YYYY 
Watch Rotation 
Type 
Text Fixed or Rotating 
Number of Watch 
Sections 
Numeric Total number of watch sections for the 
individual’s watch station 
Watch 1 Start Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
Watch 1 End Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
Watch 2 Start Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
Watch 2 End Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
Working Hours Start Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
Working Hours End Time Formatted as 00:00:00 AM in military time 
 
After the required inputs are entered in the Activity Entry tab, the watch (W) and 
work (A) activity blocks are automatically filled in the Activity Timeline tab. The 
collection form for the Activity Timeline is formatted in 15-minute time increments to 
account for staggered watch relief schemes common to most USN ships. There is a 
hierarchical structure for watch and work activities. In cases where working hours overlap 
with watch times, watch will take precedence because that is the Sailor’s main priority. For 
example, if a Sailor has watch from 0600 to 0900 and normally works from 0600 to 1600, 
the 0600 to 0900 blocks will contain a “W” and the 0915 to 1600 blocks will contain an 
“A.” The user can verify that the work/rest activity data is correct under the Activity 
Timeline tab and manually modify the information to account for watch/work changes. 
Users can also add Sleep/Rest and Maintenance activity data to the same tab.  
Once the Activity Timeline tab is populated with work/rest activity data, the 
summary metrics are automatically calculated and displayed in the Activity Summary tab 
(Table 12). The Activity Summary tab populates the pivot tables and charts in the SMART 
prototype’s dashboards.  
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Table 12. Activity Summary Tab Field Names and Attributes  
Field Name Data Type Data Source Data Description 
Watch (hours/day) Numeric Activity Timeline 
tab 
Cumulative watch time from 




Numeric Activity Timeline 
tab 
Cumulative sleep/rest time 
from 00:00 to 23:45 in 15-
minute increments 
Work (hours/day) Numeric Activity Timeline 
tab 
Cumulative work time from 




Numeric Activity Timeline 
tab 
Cumulative maintenance time 
from 00:00 to 23:45 in 15-
minute increments 




Sum of watch, work, and 
maintenance hours 
Sleep/Rest Score Numeric Activity 
Summary tab 
Integer values from 0 to 3 
Work Period Score Numeric Activity 
Summary tab 










Integer values from 0 to 2 
Risk Value Numeric Activity 
Summary tab 
Sum of the activity 
(sleep/rest, work, watch 
rotation, watch section 
number, and maintenance) 
scores 
Risk Rating Text Activity 
Summary tab 
Critical, Serious, Moderate, or 
Minor/Negligible ratings 
based on the risk value 
 
4. Dashboard Display and Reports 
The dashboard displays and reports are the outputs for the SMART prototype. 
SMART contains three dashboards separated in the Average Activity, Risk List, and Risk 
Charts tabs. Table 13 contains the field names and attributes for the dashboard displays and 
reports from the prototype. The Activity Summary tab and associated dashboards are 
designed to update as the Activity Entry or Activity Timeline tabs are changed. The 
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dynamic dashboard interfaces were designed to allow the user to quickly filter through the 
summarized data. 
Table 13. Dashboard Displays and Reports Field Name and Attributes  
Graphic Title Graphic 
Type 
Data Source Notes 
Activity 
Averages Trends 
Line Chart Activity 
Summary tab 
Displays average activity hours (e.g., 
work and sleep/rest) trends by date. 
The user can filter the results by Date, 








Displays charts for total work, 
sleep/rest, watch, and maintenance 
averages by Department. The user can 









Displays charts for total work, 
sleep/rest, watch, and maintenance 
averages by division. The user can 
filter the results by Date, Department, 
and Division. 




Displays a list of all individuals who 
fall under a specified risk rating or risk 
value. The user can filter the results by 
Date, Risk Rating, Risk Value, 
Department, Division, and Name. 
Risk Level 
Trends 
Line Chart Activity 
Summary tab 
Displays the number of individuals per 
risk rating category by date. The user 
can filter the results by Date, 









Displays charts for the number of 
individuals at each risk level category 
by department. The user can filter the 
results by Date, Department, Division, 








Displays charts for the number of 
individuals at each risk level category 
by division. The user can filter the 
results by Date, Department, Division, 
and Risk Rating. 
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C. DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS 
The following assumptions were used in the development of the SMART 
prototype: 
• Sleep/rest activity times only indicate opportunities for sleep or rest. 
• The ship utilized an approved watchbill with circadian (i.e., fixed) and 
non-circadian (i.e., rotating) rhythm-based watch rotations while 
underway. 
• Departures from the notional schedule mimicked planned and unplanned 
events which will shift a Sailor’s work/rest hours.  
• Sailors will not deviate from their scheduled watch times. 
• Daily routines events such as cleaning stations, training, messing and 
berthing inspections, mealtimes, etc., will be captured under the period 
designated as Working Hours. 
• Sailors were already qualified or PQS-assigned to stand their applicable 
watch stations and to perform their required maintenance or work tasks. 
• The scheduling events modeled reflect those of a typical warship’s 
schedule and will roughly translate to the experience of other units.  
D. FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENT 
The functionality of the SMART prototype will be assessed by how well it can 
perform the following functions: 
• Account for and calculate activity hours correctly. 
• Enable identification of individuals beyond specified activity thresholds.  
• Determine the magnitude of departure from established activity time 
limits. 
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• Provide dynamic graphical displays to enable schedulers to filter the work 
and rest activity data.  
• Enable trend analysis of activity data to showcase patterns for individuals 
or different organizational levels.  
E. CRITERIA FOR RISK ASSESSMENT 
The risk assessment criteria for the test scenarios were based on the Basic Risk 
Assessment Matrix (Table 14). In Table 14, probability refers to the frequency of 
occurrence over time. Severity is related to the effect of hazard. Risk assessment levels are 
categorized as Extremely High (EH) = 1, High (H) = 2, Medium (M) = 3, or Low (L) = 4. 
The Operational Risk Management instruction outlines the operational risk management 
(ORM) decision making process and explains the time versus non-time critical risk 
management processes (OPNAVINST 3500.39D, 2018). These criteria were chosen 
because of the Department of the Navy’s familiarity with the matrix and risk assessment 
process.  


















y Catastrophic (I) EH (1) EH (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) 
Critical (II) EH (1) H (2) H (2) M (3) L (4) 
Moderate (III) H (2) M (3) M (3) L (4) L (4) 
Negligible (IV) M (3) L (4) L (4) L (4) L (4) 
 
For example, the risk (i.e., likelihood) of the ship running aground or colliding with 
another vessel during a high-risk Sea and Anchor (S & A) evolution is increased when a 
watchstander is sleep-deprived. Similarly, a watchstander who is less alert may hurt 
themselves or cause damage to localized equipment if, for example, they inadvertently 
activate a fire suppression system or improperly shut down a running engine. Both 
situations require an assessment of risk and appropriate mitigating actions to lower the 
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assessed risk to an acceptable level. Risk mitigation may be accomplished by stationing 
safety observers in strategic locations, employing props during drills and training events, 
or assessing watchstander readiness (e.g., fatigue, illness, or injury) prior to assuming the 
watch especially during high-risk evolutions.  
The framework behind the work/rest activity data risk score assignment is 
comparable to the method by which the Individual Risk Management (IRM) code is 
assigned. The overall work/rest activity data risk score, referred to as the Concern Level in 
the prototype, is the sum of risk assessment values for various categories. Metrics from the 
service members’ activity data are collected and roughly categorized based on the activity 
thresholds outlined in the CFEMP (2017) and the IRM Tool (Appendix D). Activity limits 
were selected after combining elements from the policy and the IRMT. The combination 
allowed for less ambiguity compared to strictly adopting the IRMT Watch to Rest Ratio 
limits. Moreover, the combination accommodated stratified risk assessment ratings 
compared to strictly adopting the CFEMP limits. The metrics, criteria, and risk assessment 
values are outlined in Table 15. The activity thresholds were based on existing DON 
guidelines which directly apply to U.S. Navy warships. Moreover, the human performance 
risk metrics associated with insufficient sleep and excessive workloads are supported by 
years of crew endurance and fatigue research and are known contributors to degraded 
Sailor productivity and warfighting capacity.  
Table 15. Criterion and Risk Assessment Value 
Risk Metrics Criterion (in a 24-hour period) Risk Assessment Value 
Sleep/Rest Period Length 
Sleep/Rest hours ≤ 3 3 
3 < Sleep/Rest hours ≤ 5 2 
5 < Sleep/Rest hours < 7 1 
Sleep/Rest hours ≥ 7 0 
Total Work Period 
Length 
Work hours ≤ 8 0 
8 < Work hours ≤ 12 1 
12 < Work hours < 16 2 
Work hours ≥ 16 3 
Watch Rotation Type Fixed 0 Rotating 1 
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Risk Metrics Criterion (in a 24-hour period) Risk Assessment Value 
Number of Watch 
Sections 
Watch Sections ≤ 2 2 
Watch Sections = 3 1 
Watch Sections ≥ 4 0 
 
The final risk level values/ratings outlined in Table 16 are based on the sum of the 
sleep/rest period length, total work period length, watch rotation type, and number of watch 
sections risk assessment values. During a 24-hour period, if a Sailor had a 6-hour sleep/rest 
period, a 14-hour work period, a fixed watch, and a four section watch rotation, the Sailor 
would receive risk assessment values of 1, 2, 0, and 0, respectively (Table 15). As a result, the 
Sailor would receive a Risk Level score of 3 or Moderate (Table 16). Low Concern Levels 
values are ideal and indicate little to no additional risk due to human performance; high 
numbers indicate higher human performance risk associated with the work/rest activity data 
from the individual. The activity threshold and risk assessment values are adjustable in the 
prototype to account for policy changes or to accommodate a ship’s unique operational 
schedule. Sailors onboard a ship operating in Condition III underway steaming configuration 
will have a different work/rest activity pattern compared to Sailors operating under Condition 
I or General Quarters. The difference in operational schedules and tasking would translate to a 
different risk tolerance and warrant adjustments to the Risk Level ratings. 
Table 16. Risk Level Values and Ratings 
Values Rating 
8 + Critical 
5 - 7 Serious 
2 - 4 Moderate 
0 - 1 Minor/Negligible 
 
F. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Notional crew and work/rest activity data were used to test whether the SMART 
prototype functioned properly. The following section describes the test case data generated, 
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SMART prototype functions tested, scenario descriptions, and criteria used to evaluate the 
SMART prototype.  
1. Data Description 
The SMART prototype was populated with a crew complement based on a notional 
guided missile destroyer (DDG) platform. Table 17 contains a summary of the 
departments, divisions, and rates associated with the hypothetical individuals and was 
adapted from Table 9 of Lieutenant Garbacz’s 2019 thesis. Officers are not listed in Table 
17 because they span the departments and divisions.  
Table 17. Department, Division or Work Center, and Rates Summary 









ER DC, HT, & FN 
MP GSE, GSM, & GS 
Executive/Navigation 
(EXEC/NAV) 
EX MA, NC, PS, RP, & YN 
HM HM 
NN QM 
Operations (OPS) OD BM & SN OI OS 
Plans and Tactics 
(PT) 
CA STG 





Weapons (WEPS) CG GM CM FC 
 
One hundred sixty-eight hours of activity data spanning seven days was used to 
model the work and sleep/rest activities of Sailors onboard the theoretical ship. The 
generated test case watch activity data was based on historical watchbills from a DDG. The 
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seven-day timeframe has two days in port followed by five days underway and formed 
the framework for the functional analysis of the prototype (Table 18). Human 
performance risk related to insufficient sleep opportunity and long workdays was 
assessed using the Basic Risk Assessment Matrix (Table 14). Risk mitigating actions were 
not included during the initial Risk Assessment Codes (RAC) calculations when they 
were associated with the evolutions of interest listed in Table 18.  
Table 18. Activity Time Period and Evolutions of Interest 
Day (Date) Ship Status Evolutions of Interest Risk Assessment Code 
1 
(September 8, 2020) In port Duty Section Low 
2 
(September 9, 2020) Underway 





(September 10, 2020) Underway 





(September 11, 2020) Underway 





(September 12, 2020) Underway 





(September 13, 2020) Underway 





(September 14, 2020) In port 







The user can complete the following main tasks using the SMART prototype: 
• Add/Delete/Modify personnel database entries in the Crew List tab.
• Add/Modify watch and work activity hours in the Activity Entry tab.
• Modify watch and work activity hours in the Activity Timeline tab.
• Add/Modify sleep/rest activity data in the Activity Entry tab.
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• Adjust activity threshold values in the Individual Summary tab. 
After the main tasks are completed, the prototype calculates summary data, assigns 
risk assessment values, and categorizes the information. The summary results are displayed 
on the appropriate dashboard where the user can then perform the following actions: 
• Assess the overall human performance risk status of the crew at three 
organizational levels. 
• Assess individual human performance risk. 
3. Prototype Response to Specified Scenarios 
Typically, a scheduler assigns personnel for watches, special evolutions, or work 
details devoid of previous or sometimes even current work/rest activity information. The 
SMART prototype was assessed based on how it detects human performance risk during two 
scenarios. The first scenario involved a human performance risk assessment for S & A 
watchstanders. The second scenario involved an assessment of departmental, divisional, and 
individual performance risk during routine underway (Condition III) operating conditions. The 
Sailors were split into best, mixed, and worst-case groups, with 98 individuals for each group, 
based on how their work/rest activity data was populated (Table 19). The wide range of values 
covered by the mixed-case group was intended to model the effect of unplanned tasking, 
additional work responsibilities, and general unpredictability inherent in everyday naval 
operations. Additionally, the values for work and sleep/rest hours were varied each day for the 
mixed-case group to reflect the variability in an individual’s schedule.  
Table 19. Heuristic Value Assignments by Case 
Note: Total work hours include work and maintenance hours.  
Heuristic Best Case Mixed Case Worst Case 
Total Work Hours ≤ 8 16 ≤ __ ≤ 8 ≥ 16 
Sleep/Rest Hours ≥ 7 7 ≤ __ ≤ 3 ≤ 3 
Watch Rotation Type Fixed Fixed or Rotating Rotating 
Number of Watch Sections ≥ 4 4 ≤ __ ≤ 2 ≤ 2 
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This chapter contains descriptive statistics of the notional data, functional 
assessment, initial prototype results, sensitivity comparison, and results for specified 
scenarios.  
A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE NOTIONAL DATA 
The ship’s crew was based on a notional DDG’s crew complement. The crew 
members, composed of 294 unique individuals, were interspersed between seven 
departments (Figure 27) and 19 divisions (Figure 28). Although the number of individuals 
by department and division vary, there is a consistent pattern of a high enlisted personnel 
to officer ratio which is typical of a warship’s crew composition (Figures 27 and 28). The 
abbreviated departments and divisions for the following figures were based on the 
organizational structure introduced in Table 17. The department designations are as 
follows: Combat Systems (CS), Engineering (ENG), Operations (OPS), Supply (SUP), 
Executive/Navigation (EXEC/NAV), Weapons (WEPS), and Planning and Tactics (PT).  
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Figure 27. Distribution of Officers and Enlisted Personnel by 
Department 
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B. FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENT 
Based on the notional data, the SMART prototype was able to properly quantify 
and categorize the human performance risk for all crew members. The prototype’s 
functionality was assessed based on a simple yes or no scale based on the evaluation factors 
listed in the Functionality Assessment subsection (pp. 63–64). Although there are still areas 
for improvement, the SMART prototype met all the functional criteria previously listed 
(Table 20).  
At its current state, SMART does not provide recommendations for limiting human 
performance risk or staying within recommended activity thresholds. However, it provides 
users with several benefits. First, the user can record and process activity information in a 
holistic way. Previously, there was no widely available approach to account for man-hours, 
outside of maintenance tracking, at an individual or organizational level. Second, the 
outputs provide users with insight into the crew’s workloads, enabling proactive scheduling 
and more effective crew resource management decision making. Lastly, the human 
performance risk heuristics provide visibility on a formerly untapped data source, allowing 
for intuitive and targeted risk mitigation actions. Future development of the tool could 
include additional data points such as a work center organizational level, qualifications 
listing, watch station assignment and location associations, and additional activity types. 
Table 20. SMART Functionality Assessment 
Code Evaluation Factor Y/N Notes 
A Accuracy (SMART is able to…) 
A1 calculate activity times correctly Y The day ends at 2345 vice 2359.  
A2 quantify risk values correctly Y  
A3 categorize risk correctly Y  
F/C Flexibility/Customization (users are able to…) 
FC1 add other activity categories Y Developer (hidden) option and 
requires more experience with 
Excel to minimize errors. 
FC2 account for watches or work 
periods that span two days 
Y Watches spanning two days must 
be split between two 24-hour 
periods. For example, a 2200–
0200 watch should be accounted 
for as 2200–2345 for the first 
74 
Code Evaluation Factor Y/N Notes 
day and 0000–0200 for the 
second day. 
F Functionality (SMART is able to…) 
F1 record and retain personnel data Y  
F2 record and retain activity data Y  
F3 identify individuals by risk value Y  
F4 identify individuals by risk 
category 
Y  
F5 determine the magnitude of 
departure from recommended 
activity time limits 
Y Visual markers associated with 
the risk levels are displayed on 
the charts.  
F6 perform activity time trend 
analysis by organizational level 
Y  
F7 perform activity time trend 
analysis for individuals 
Y  
D Display (SMART utilizes…) 
D1 dynamic graphic displays Y  




C. INITIAL PROTOTYPE RESULTS 
Instead of conducting a direct comparison between the watch time and watch 
station assignments from the available historical watchbills, the activity assignments were 
varied based on the heuristic value thresholds by case as outlined in Table 19. This slight 
modification to the activity data entry process occurred due to the assignment of multiple 
watches or the presence of conflicting watch times for several personnel. For example, an 
individual was assigned all-day watches (e.g., Duty Admin, Reaction Force Member, and 
Investigator from 0630 to 0630) and a static watch (e.g., Entry Control Point Sentry from 
1700 to 2200). This made it difficult to ascertain when they performed work-related 
activities outside of their static watch assignment. The changes were still in keeping with 
typical watch assignment practices and had minimal impact on the utility of the protype. 
The mixed case group thresholds were randomly varied to span the range between the best- 
and worst-case limits. Due to the small sample size, the activity values were not distributed 
in a normal fashion and were randomly varied throughout the notional study period.  
Figures 29 through 35 are screenshots of the initial outputs from the prototype after 
the notional data was entered. The red, orange, yellow, and green dashed lines visually 
reinforce the corresponding activity thresholds as listed in Table 15. Each color follows the 
risk rating color scheme outlined in Table 16: red (critical), orange (serious), yellow 
(moderate), and green (minor/negligible). The total work time, as indicated by the purple 
squares, are the summation of watch, maintenance, and work activity categories (Figure 
29). The user can see how total work hours for the entire study period hover around 12 
hours which is associated with a moderate human performance risk rating (Figure 29). The 
watch and work hours remain relatively consistent, while the changes in maintenance hours 
significantly contribute to changing total work time trends (Figure 29). A large spike in 
maintenance hours, as seen on September 13th, is a point of interest. The increase in 
maintenance hours could be attributed to a variety of causes such as equipment failure, 
failure to balance workloads evenly throughout the work week, or maintenance 
requirements associated with the prior to entering port checklist. Whatever the reason, it 
may be prudent to investigate the cause of the sharp increase to reduce the likelihood of it 
occurring again. Crew members averaged between five to seven hours of sleep with minor 
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fluctuations during the study period, which is associated with serious to moderate human 
performance risk, respectively (Figure 30). The lack of sleep is not overly surprising since 
typical workdays were around 12 hours (Figure 29).  
 
Figure 29. Initial Average Work Activity Trends 
 
Figure 30. Initial Average Sleep/Rest Activity Trends 
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Figures 31 and 32 detail the average work activities by department and division. 
The error bars displayed on Figures 31 and 32 were based on the following standard error 
formula: Standard Error = Standard Deviation(Sampling Range) / Square 
Root(Count(Sampling Range)). The prototype was able to discern differences in the 
distribution of work activity averages between departments (Figure 31) and divisions 
(Figure 32). This functionality indicates the ability to measure how a Sailor’s 
organizational affiliation can influence how much and what type of work they will perform. 
The SMART prototype allows for the quantification and comparison of workloads at 
varying organizational levels, adding credence to the “choose your rate, choose your fate” 
sentiment.  
 
Figure 31. Initial Average Work Activity Times by Department 
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Figure 32. Initial Average Work Activity Times by Division 
The average sleep/rest times look relatively constant across departments with the 
supply and planning and tactics departments averaging the most sleep at 6.6 hours and 6.3 
hours, respectively (Figure 33). Unfortunately, all departments and divisions fell below the 
National Sleep Foundation’s recommended threshold of eight hours of sleep (Figures 33 
and 34). Although the numbers do not speak to the quality of sleep or whether the 
individual was sleeping or just allotted time to sleep/rest, the data-driven graphics 
emphasize the chronic problem of inadequate sleep. The capability to sort activity 
information by organizational level provides leaders with the ability to pinpoint 
departments or divisions suffering from high workloads and insufficient sleep/rest time. 
This insight allows leaders to implement targeted crew resource management mitigations 
such as increasing training opportunities to produce more qualified personnel or requesting 




Figure 33. Initial Average Sleep/Rest Time by Department 
 
Figure 34. Initial Average Sleep/Rest Time by Division 
The human performance risk, mainly in the moderate (yellow) and serious (orange) 
categories, associated with the crew’s activity data greatly fluctuates throughout the study 
period (Figure 35). All best-case scenario individuals (n = 98) fall under the minor risk 
(green) category, while any additional minor risk individuals were from the mixed-case 
scenario group. Although an individual’s shift from one risk category to another is not 
explicitly shown, users can gain a sense of magnitude and degree of change in human 
performance risk over time (Figure 35). It is concerning to observe the increasing number 
of critical risk individuals, especially towards the end of the study period which coincides 
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with a high-risk Sea and Anchor evolution (Figure 35). Figures 36 and 37 show the number 
of critical and serious risk individuals by organizational level. The majority of the critical 
risk individuals, 177, and serious risk individuals, 70, are from the Engineering Department 
followed by the Operations Department with 143 critical and 52 serious risk individuals 
(Figures 36 and 37). This insight facilitates greater understanding about the human 
performance risk trends throughout the study period. Moreover, the categorization and 
quantification of risk enables leaders to implement targeted human performance risk 
reduction actions. 
 




Figure 36. Number of Critical Risk Individuals by Department (left) and Division (right) 
 
Figure 37. Number of Serious Risk Individuals by Department (left) and Division (right) 
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D. SENSITIVITY COMPARISON 
The SMART prototype’s initial results demonstrated its ability to process and 
display activity trends and human performance risk metrics. While the tool provides helpful 
information for assessing risk and managing crew resources, it is not without its limitations. 
The prototype’s ability to illustrate the differences in magnitude for the best-case and 
worst-case individuals requires some refinement. This subsection showcases several 
instances where the prototype was not particularly sensitive to individuals operating in the 
extremes. These examples provide an overview of the starkly different prototype results 
based on an individual’s case group classification.  
Sailors in the best-case group received adequate sleep/rest opportunities (≥ 7 
hours/day), low to moderate total work hours (≤ 8 hours/day), were in non-rotating 
watches, and stood watches with at least four watch sections. Sailors in the worst-case 
group received little to no sleep/rest opportunities (≤ 3 hours/day), high total work hours 
(≥ 16 hours/day), were in rotating watches, and stood watches with no more than three 
watch sections. Sailors in the mixed case group received a range of sleep/rest opportunities 
(0 - 12.25 hours/day) and total work hours (7.5 - 21 hours/day), were assigned fixed and 
rotating watches, and were in various sized watch sections (1 – 5 sections). The prototype 
only categorizes people based on their risk value score or risk rating category; it does not 
separate individuals into best, worst, and mixed case groups. Partitioning individuals into 
these case groups was an artificially induced event meant to test the sensitivity of the 
prototype. 
The average work activity trend comparisons show that the best-case group deflated 
the average work time increases from the mixed and worst-case groups. (Figure 38). There 
were no total work time instances which exceeded the 16-hour recommended threshold 
compared to three instances each for the mixed (September 10, 13, and 14) and worst-case 
(September 8, 13, and 14) groups (Figure 38). Unless the user filtered their results 
appropriately, they may not see these troubling spikes in total work times. The comparisons 
also indicate that the fluctuations in maintenance hours were substantial contributors to 
increasing total work times for the mixed and worst-case groups, which is reflected by the 
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initial output (Figure 38). Figure 38 also shows that the pattern of relatively static amounts 
of watch hours throughout the data collection period holds true for all case groups and is 
reflected by the initial output.  
The SMART prototype was also not particularly sensitive to the extremely high 
and extremely low levels of sleep/rest opportunities between the best and worst-case 
groups, respectively (Figure 29). One of the most concerning observations was that the 
worst-case group averaged three or fewer hours of sleep/rest time during the entire data 
collection period (Figure 29). Despite the shocking trend of all those individuals operating 
in the red, there were no instances where the average dipped below five hours in the initial 
output (Figure 29). The eight or more hours of sleep/rest time from the best-case group 
dampened the prototype’s ability to reflect the increased risk the worst-case group was 
experiencing. Interestingly, the activity average oscillations observed within the mixed-
case group output are reflected in the initial output as seen in the dips on September 9, 10, 
and 13 (Figure 29).  
The SMART prototype’s average metric may provide misleading results, especially 
in cases where comparatively equal proportions of the crew are operating on extremes of 
the activity spectrum. Perhaps a minimum and maximum trend analysis would provide 
more context to the average results currently displayed and could be incorporated into the 
next version of the prototype. This sensitivity limitation demonstrates that great care should 
always be taken when interpreting these results. Fortunately, users have the ability to 
analyze the summarized results in the Activity Summary tab to provide additional context 
to the average activity outputs. While individuals operating in the serious or critical risk 
categories may not be readily apparent in the activity trends outputs, they are easily 
identifiable in the Risk List and Risk Charts tabs. Users are not only able to track the 
number of people at each risk category (Figure 40), but they are also able to filter that 
information based on organizational level (e.g., department, division, or individual) and 
identify specific individuals based on their risk value or risk category rating. Additional 




Figure 38. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Work Activity Trends 
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Figure 39. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Sleep/Rest Activity Trends 
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Figure 40. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Risk Trends 
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E. OUTPUT TO SPECIFIED SCENARIOS 
1. Sea and Anchor Watchbill Human Performance Risk Assessment 
The Sea and Anchor (S & A) watchbill assessment involves the review of several 
prototype outputs and scheduling considerations. For the prototype evaluation purposes, 
the user will be the Operations Officer (OPSO), a department head, looking to assess the 
human performance risk within a proposed inbound S & A watchbill scheduled for 
September 14th. OPSO would select the period of interest, September 8–13, and Operations 
Department (Figure 41). September 14th was excluded because the data has yet to be 
populated for the purposes of this scenario. The OD and OI divisions will be automatically 
selected since they belong to the Operations Department (Figure 41).  
 
Figure 41. Operations Department Filter Selections for Sea and 
Anchor Watchbill Evaluation 
The resulting outputs, Figures 42 through 44, can provide the user with several 
insights to base their watchbill evaluation upon. Figure 42 shows that there are 26 critical, 
9 serious, 1 moderate, and 17 minor risk departmental personnel listed under September 
13th, one day prior to the high-risk S & A evolution. OPS can find the names of all critical 
risk individuals to compare against the departmental personnel listed on the proposed 
watchbill to assess how many personnel may require intervention (Figure 43). The 
moderate (yellow) and serious (orange) human performance risk associated with the 
department’s activity data fluctuated greatly throughout the data collection period (Figure 
42). While the numbers of minor (green) risk individuals remained comparatively steady, 
the number of critical (red) risk individuals spike on September 13th (Figure 42). This is an 
especially concerning trend for the OPSO to note since many of his or her Sailors are 
involved in this evolution. Members from the OD division are particularly susceptible to 
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more serious physical injuries due to their proximity to heavy equipment or tensioned lines 
during the S & A evolution. 
Based on that risk information displayed by the prototype, OPSO can implement 
several interventions to mitigate human performance risk for his or her personnel. Three 
possible interventions would be to adjust the Sailor’s schedule to include more time for 
rest prior to the following day’s evolution, assign another safety observer at that particular 
watch station location, or to substitute the critical risk watch stander with another qualified 
lower-risk individual. The latter intervention is facilitated by the minor risk filtered list 
prototype output from the Risk List dashboard, which shows 17 potential candidates for 
substitution (Figure 44). The Operations Department filtered average activity trends 
(Figures 55 and 56) were not directly relevant to this assessment but are available in 
Appendix E for reference.  
 
Figure 42. Operations Department Filtered Risk Level Trends from 
September 8–13, 2020 
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Figure 43. Critical Risk Listing of Operations Department Individuals 
from September 13 
 
Figure 44. Minor/Negligible Risk Listing of Operations Department 
Individuals from September 13 
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2. Divisional Activity and Human Performance Risk Assessments 
For the next example, the users will be the divisional leadership of the CM division. 
The Strike Officer (STRIKE) leads the CM division which is comprised of Fire Control 
Technicians (FCs). FCs operate and maintain the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Systems 
integral to supporting Strike Warfare (STW) missions. The divisional leadership’s goals 
are to perform an activity time review and human performance risk assessment for their 
entire division spanning the whole study period (Table 21). First, the users would select 
the period of interest, September 8–14, 2020, and the CM division from the available 
filters. The resulting outputs, Figures 45 through 49 can provide the users with useful 
information to base their assessments on. 
Table 21. Weapons Department CM Division Members 
Rank/Rate Name Job Title Type 
ENS Mildred Burke STRIKE Officer 
FCC Sara Del Rey LCPO Enlisted 
FC1 Jake Roberts LPO Enlisted 
FC1 John Cena WCS Enlisted 
FC2 Akira Hokuto  Enlisted 
FC2 Mickie Foley  Enlisted 
FC2 Shawn Michaels  Enlisted 
FC3 Chris Jericho  Enlisted 
FC1 Judy Grable  Enlisted 
FC1 Kurt Angle  Enlisted 
FC2 Randy Savage  Enlisted 
FC1 Ima Sailor  Enlisted 
FC2 Davy Jones  Enlisted 
FC3 Ono Goose  Enlisted 
 
Figure 45 shows that the division averaged 12 hours of total work with a noticeable 
spike in maintenance hours on September 13th. This increase may be associated with a 
faulty system requiring repair or greater than normal periodic maintenance requirements. 
A Work Center Supervisor (WCS) can utilize the information from Figures 45 and 46 to 
better inform their maintenance planning schedules in the future by distributing 
maintenance hours more evenly throughout the work week. A comparison of work activity 
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averages shows that the CM division completes more maintenance and work hours when 
compared to another Weapons Department division (Figure 46). This observation may be 
useful in determining the proportion of divisional personnel that should be allocated for 
work details or for the assignment of additional tasking. 
 
Figure 45. CM Division Filtered Risk Work Activity Trends from 
September 8–14, 2020 
 
Figure 46. Weapons Department Filtered Average Work Activity 
Times 
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The CM division appears to be getting consistent amounts of sleep/rest 
opportunities but is still operating below the recommended NSF standard of eight hours 
(Figure 47). Additionally, the CM division is consistently getting less sleep/rest 
opportunities, approximately one hour less, when compared to CG division (Figure 48). 
Research has shown that operating at sustained levels of sleep debt has detrimental effects 
on human performance and increases human performance risk (Shattuck et al., 2014; 
Shattuck & Matsangas, 2016; Belenky et al., 2003). A significant proportion of the division 
was assessed as operating at critical to moderate risk, with large fluctuations in risk levels, 
throughout the data collection period (Figure 49). Divisional leadership can use this 
information to implement steps to increase sleep/rest opportunities for their Sailors to 
mitigate for these human performance risks. 
 
Figure 47. CM Division Filtered Risk Work Activity Trends from 
September 8–14, 2020 
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Figure 48. Weapons Department Filtered Average Sleep/Rest Activity 
Times 
 
Figure 49. CM Division Filtered Risk Level Trends 
3. Critical Billet Holder and Individual Tracking 
The next scenario is a human performance risk and readiness evaluation of a Search 
and Rescue (SAR) swimmer, a critical billet holder. Ships are required to have “properly 
equipped Search and Rescue Swimmers” (DON, 2011, p. 2). Failing to meet the 
requirement of having two SAR swimmers onboard is considered a redline, defined as a 
“personnel or equipment standard that must be met before a ship can safely get or remain 
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underway” (DON, 2011, p. 2). While decision makers considered factors such as the 
currency of the SAR swimmer’s qualification and their demonstrated proficiency, they did 
not have a way of assessing human performance risk based on their historical activity data. 
First, the user filters their selection for a specific individual, such as the fictional 
character of Harley Quinn (Figure 50). The dynamic nature of the prototype’s filter 
selections automatically shows the individual’s organizational affiliation, Operations 
Department in OD division (Figure 50). The Sailor’s work and sleep/rest activity averages 
wildly fluctuate throughout the data collection period (Figures 50). The work activity 
averages ranged from 11 to 18-hour total workdays where the Sailor worked three, 18-hour 
days during the week (Figure 50). While the Sailor averaged six hours of sleep/rest 
opportunity for the week, it was largely inconsistent and prone to substantial downturns or 
upticks (Figure 50). The erratic activity patterns elevated the Sailor’s human performance 
risk scores to critical on September 9th and 13th; both days coincided with high total work 
hours and low sleep/rest hours (Figure 50). There could have been substantial risk involved 
if the SAR swimmer were deployed for a rescue mission during those two days. Risks 
could include injury to the SAR swimmer, potential loss of a critical billet holder, or the 
failure to safely rescue someone. With the information presented by the SMART prototype, 
users would be made aware of those potential risks. Decision makers could then make data-
driven and risk-informed decisions like deploying the other rescue swimmer if needed.  
For the last example, a Chief Petty Officer wants to nominate Ima Sailor for an 
award while collecting inputs for their Sailor’s evaluation report. Activity summaries for 
Ima Sailor show that she worked an average of 15.36 hours during the week and worked 
three 18-hour days (Figure 52). Those three days may have coincided with emergent repairs 
for a critical system or her taking on extra maintenance responsibilities which would be 
positive points. The review also revealed Ima Sailor’s chronic pattern of inadequate sleep, 
three or fewer hours per day (Figure 52) and consistent operation in the critical risk zone 
(Figure 53). Now that the Chief is aware of that information, he or she can work with their 
Sailor to ensure adequate rest opportunities and find ways to reduce their workload.  
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Figure 50. Average Activity Dashboard for the Search and Rescue Swimmer 
 
Figure 51. Risk Rating Trends for Search and Rescue Swimmer 
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Figure 52. Average Activity Trends Dashboard for Individual Tracking 
 
Figure 53. Risk Rating Trends for Individual Tracking
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Despite the use of notional data for analysis, the SMART prototype demonstrated 
the capability of highlighting and quantifying human performance risk associated with 
work/rest activity data. While the SMART tool does not provide explicit recommendations 
for reducing risk, it begins to bridge the gap between intuitive and data-driven decision 
making. The illustrative examples were just a sampling of insights that could be gleaned 
from utilizing this prototype. The SMART tool showcased tangible ways to support the 
warfighter through data-driven decision making and risk management.  
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The objective of this thesis was to create a prototype tracking tool capable of 
systematically assessing human performance risk associated with a Sailor’s work and rest 
activities. This thesis produced a prototype tool in Excel and described how it can be used 
to highlight work/rest activity trends and provide users with activity-based human 
performance risk assessments. The prototype outputs can equip decision makers with a 
data-driven means for mitigating fatigue while developing judicious watchbills and work 
schedules. Moreover, COs can now have a methodical way of evaluating human 
performance risk to maximize crew resilience and improve warfighter performance. 
Commands can tailor this decision aid to address their own specific requirements and 
organizational structure while maintaining the underlying functionality of the tool. This 
chapter discusses some of the study limitations and insights gained during the tool 
development process.  
A. LESSONS LEARNED AND DEVELOPMENT OBSERVATIONS 
Modeling the notional data after historical watchbills was helpful in providing 
realism to the work/rest activity data; however, it also posed three major alignment 
challenges. First, there were several instances where watchstanders were assigned multiple 
watches during the same period. Multiple assignments made it difficult to accurately 
account for an individual’s work times because it was unknown whether their other watches 
were activated and when they were activated. Second, there were other instances where 
watchstanders were assigned overlapping or concurrent watches during the same period 
which made accounting for an individual’s cumulative watch hours challenging. Third, the 
sleep and maintenance times were used to round out a notional crew member’s day but 
were not based on sleep/maintenance data from an actual ship. Instead of performing a 
direct comparison between actual and notional crew members and their schedules, the 
activity data population process was modified to ensure an adequate sampling for each 
study group.  
100 
Developing prototype functions and outputs with limited user feedback was 
challenging due to the need to deduce which functions and features users would find 
beneficial. This underscored the benefits of iterative development with consistent user 
feedback built-in to the process. Future prototype testing would be invaluable in improving 
the overall functionality of the tool to ensure that the outputs enable users to better assess 
human performance risk and implement more efficient crew resource management actions. 
B. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
This study and the prototype itself have several limitations to include the creation 
and application of the risk mitigation heuristics, the use of notional data to demonstrate the 
prototype, and the reliance on self-reported activity data to populate the spreadsheets.  
First, the heuristics selected to track, detect, and quantify human performance risk 
are by no means a comprehensive listing. The default numerical thresholds chosen were 
based on a mixture of policy guidelines and scientific findings. They would benefit from 
operational validation studies. Developing human performance risk heuristics was 
particularly perplexing because of the many factors that influence human performance. 
Currently, the prototype does not incorporate a host of known human performance risk 
factors such as breaks between working periods (Folkard et al., 2007; Tucker et al., 2003; 
Tucker et al., 2006), cumulative sleep debt (Shattuck et al., 2014; Shattuck & Matsangas, 
2016; Belenky et al., 2003), presence and effects of sleep disorders (Shattuck & Matsangas, 
2019), use of stimulants e.g., caffeine and energy drinks (Lim & Dinges, 2008; Darwent et 
al., 2015), and circadian rhythms  (Shattuck et al., 2018; Shattuck & Matsangas, 2016; 
Miller et al., 2007; Miller & Eddy, 2008; Mysliwiec et al., 2016). Moreover, identifying 
conclusive human performance activity thresholds specifically targeted towards the surface 
combatant community was challenging. Utilizing Excel to model complex heuristics and 
multifaceted human performance factors interactions also posed a considerable modelling 
challenge. Even though wake/rest activity times are available in the prototype, accounting 
for inconsistent sleep/wake rhythms and sleep fragmentation (Gonçalves et al., 2015) may 
be beyond the capability of the software. This limitation may constrain the human 
performance factors and relationships that can be incorporated within the prototype in the 
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future. With that said, the selected heuristics and their application do begin to address the 
fatigue and rest management issues cited in the Comprehensive Review as attributable 
causes for the mishaps (DON, 2017).  
Second, the data used to test this prototype are notional and may not be 
representative of actual operational scenarios. While the notional data were based on a 
typical DDG crew complement, the number of individuals and the proportions between 
departments and divisions are subject to change. The notional watch and work times were 
based on historical watchbills and are expected to fluctuate depending on the platform, 
ship, or command. Moreover, the total work hours, maintenance hours, sleep/rest hours, 
watch rotation types, and number of watch sections were deliberately manipulated to 
illustrate best-case, mixed-case, and worst-case scenarios outlined in the Methodology 
chapter (Table 18). The notional crew and activity data will almost certainly not be 
representative of the entire fleet; the prototype outputs are not meant to represent any actual 
crews; consequently, they do not allow for direct comparisons. 
Lastly, the outputs are based on self-reported activity data and are subject to bias. 
This bias could be addressed using wearable physiological monitoring devices or mobile 
applications to replace or verify the self-reported activity data (O’Connor & Patillo, 2003). 
Users may fail to record their activity data or over/underinflate their activity hours. 
Additionally, if the entire crew does not participate, those individuals who actively use the 
tool may not be representative of the crew, thereby leading to misleading results.  
C. INSIGHTS 
The coronavirus pandemic necessitated many changes to typical military 
operations. This current prototype can offer insight into how the pandemic has impacted 
already strained operational schedules and individual workloads. Additionally, the 
information on work/rest activities collected in this prototype could reduce the gap in 
current human performance risk analyses and enrich fatigue models tailored to the military 
maritime environment. The activity data can also be used to illustrate the disparity between 
the activity hours allocated versus the activity hours performed in manpower models to 
significantly influence manning decisions. With the prototype complete, we have the 
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opportunity to develop the SMART further, validate it by comparing it to commercially 
available software such as OWL FM or FAST, or potentially update software like RADM 
to include similar functionality. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter contains recommendations for future research and future prototype 
development ideas. With the prototype complete, the U.S. Navy can choose to develop the 
SMART further, field commercially available software (e.g., OWL FM or FAST), update 
software like RADM to include similar functionality, or include surface combatant-specific 
human performance risk factors into fatigue or sleep models like SAFTE. 
A. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Test Prototype 
The major next step for this prototype is to test it onboard ships and solicit user 
feedback mainly in the areas of usability, feasibility, and acceptability. Usability is defined 
as “a quality attribute that assesses how easy user interfaces are to use” and also “refers to 
methods for improving ease-of-use during the design process” (Nielsen, 2012, para. 1). 
Assessing the usability elements of learnability, efficiency, memorability, software and 
operator errors, and user satisfaction would improve the tool’s functionality and utility for 
the users (Nielsen, 2012). Evaluating the prototype’s feasibility should involve an analysis 
of the tool’s practicality and how it could be integrated for regular use onboard ships 
(Bowen et al., 2009). Acceptability “refers to determining how well an intervention will be 
received by the target population and the extent to which the new intervention or its 
components might meet the needs of the target population and organizational setting” 
(Ayala & Elder, 2011, p. 1). For the study’s purposes, the use of the prototype would be 
considered the intervention. Use of focus groups and stakeholder interviews during the 
acceptability assessment phase would reduce the risk of rejection by the target population 
(Ayala & Elder, 2011) so the tool can be used to collect data for additional human 
performance risk studies and workload metrics tracking.  
Along the same vein, conducting a tradeoff analysis between minimizing the data 
entry burden and producing worthwhile outputs would contribute to the future success of 
this tool. Investigating the feasibility of incorporating wearable activity monitoring devices 
would allow for objective activity data collection and reduce the burden of data entry. 
104 
Changes to the output should be targeted toward helping Sailors work more efficiently and 
safely through the incorporation of risk-conscious planning practices. Determining which 
activity categories, metrics, and visualizations enable users to better assess human 
performance risk and implement more efficient crew resource management actions would 
be key to this effort. Moreover, gathering stakeholder feedback would assist in improving 
the heuristics and functionality of the tool. 
2. Improve Heuristics 
As mentioned in the study limitations section (p. 47), the selected activity 
thresholds were by no means a comprehensive listing of human performance risk factors. 
Given that there are many factors that influence human performance, finding ways to 
include additional human performance risk factors in a meaningful way would greatly 
improve the prototype’s outputs. Bridging the human performance risk data gap for surface 
combatants could clarify the relationships between certain activity thresholds like 
cumulative sleep and work times to offer new insight into heuristic improvements. 
Researching the interplay between human performance risk factors and the extent to which 
they influence surface combatants would also enrich the tool’s ability to assess human 
performance risk onboard ships. The current risk evaluation structure is based on 
summative values which may not be an accurate predictor of the risks Sailors face at sea.  
3. Assess Operational Utility 
Lastly, research should be devoted to assessing the operational utility of the 
prototype. The evaluation process could investigate whether the outputs of the prototype 
result in improved crew resource management decisions or fatigue management actions. 
The data from this research could reveal whether schedulers are more aware of risk when 
planning or scheduling personnel for evolutions. In addition, researchers could assess if the 
use of the prototype, in conjunction with other risk mitigation actions, results in a reduction 
of mishap occurrences, an increase in worker productivity and efficiency, or an 
improvement in combat effectiveness. 
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B. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
The SMART prototype offers four distinct advantages. The prototype’s scalable 
data structure allows for its use on various ship platforms or shore-based organizations. 
Second, the prototype is readily available at no additional cost onboard ships and at shore 
installations. Third, the prototype does not require network connectivity, which is restricted 
during certain operations. Lastly, the prototype does not require the use of accessory 
devices such as cellphones or activity watches/monitors. Despite these advantages, there 
are still areas for improvement. Some of these ideas are listed below. 
1. Auto-populate Activity Data 
Developing a way to auto-populate activity data from existing databases like 
RADM or SKED would reduce the administrative burden of manual data entry and 
streamline the data collection process. Another way to decrease the data entry burden could 
be addressed by issuing physiological monitoring devices or mobile applications to support 
the self-reported activity data (O’Connor & Patillo, 2003). The current data collection 
scheme has the potential to be labor-intensive and may discourage users from adopting this 
tool into their risk mitigation and planning practices.  
2. Watchbill Functionality 
Incorporating certain watchbill-related functions into this tool could potentially 
make it a centralized place for personnel scheduling functions. Functions such as adding 
watch station, watch section, qualification, and projected rotation date (PRD) tracking 
would have many potential benefits. First, PRD, watch section, and watch station tracking 
could be used to create watch team replacement plans (WTRPs) which are required 
products for quarterly program and divisional reviews. Second, tracking watch station 
information would allow for the creation of validation checks to guard against multiple 
watch station assignments or overlapping watch time assignments. In addition to receiving 
confirmation notifications prior to assigning personnel numerous watches or inconsistent 
watch times, a scheduler could also benefit from alerts related to exceeding established 
watch hour limits. Alongside the other activity information from maintenance, meetings, 
or training events provided by the tool, these additional notifications would be useful tools 
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in taking other work responsibilities into consideration when assigning personnel work. 
Finally, tracking watch section information would be useful in monitoring watch station 
end strength so leaders could better plan for training reliefs or requesting temporary or 
permanent manning supplements to bolster undermanned sections.  
3. Activity Category Determination 
The prototype currently supports four activity categories, but its utility will improve 
by adding more activity options. The prototype does not record activity information as 
detailed as other NPS studies involving activity log tracking. These additional categories 
could include meetings and trainings (i.e., service diversions), eating/messing, and 
personal time. Future development must aim to strike a balance between the granularity 
level of the activity data collected and the time it takes users to accurately classify and 
input the data. Additionally, activity classification determination should be a standardized 
process. The activity information collected should be formatted and applied towards 
improving manpower models and human performance and fatigue modeling research 
efforts.  
4. Metrics and Visualizations 
User evaluation of the prototype will be critical in determining what additional 
features, metrics, and visualizations should be included for follow-on development. This 
evaluation may result in updates to the GUI, data collection structure and methodology, or 
the outputs of the prototype. One suggestion is to automate the Individual Risk 
Management Tool (IRMT) evaluation process so a user can incorporate the work/rest 
activity ratings directly into a completed form.  
In conclusion, to increase warfighter performance, operational effectiveness, 
operational safety, and crew endurance, the U.S. Navy must invest in fatigue management 
tools and methods tailored to the surface combatant community. We need to foster 
innovation and support cultural shifts aimed at decreasing the risk associated with degraded 
human performance. The Scheduling Management Aid for Risk Tracking prototype is one 
small effort to standardize data-driven human performance risk assessment.  
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APPENDIX A. SUMMARY OF SEVEN HUMAN FATIGUE AND 
PERFORMANCE BIOMATHEMATICAL MODELS 
 
Figure 54. Table of Current Prediction Goals of Biomathematical 
Models of Fatigue and Performance. Source: Mallis et al. (2004). 
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Figure 55. Table of Capabilities Currently Implemented in the Models. 
Source: Mallis et al. (2004). 
 




Figure 57. Table of Primary Outputs for Models. Source: Mallis et al. 
(2004). 
 
Figure 58. Table of Model Information. Source: Mallis et al. (2004). 
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APPENDIX B. CONCEPT MAP OF COMMANDING OFFICER (CO) SCHEDULING 
CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
 
Figure 59. Complete Concept Map of Commanding Officer Scheduling Considerations and Constraints. Source: 
Brown (n.d.). 
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL FIGURES FROM THE OPTIMIZED 
WATCHBILL AND LOGISTICS FATIGUE METER (OWL FM) 
 
The following three figures are additional screenshots from OWL FM which 
illustrate other useful functions for personnel scheduling and fatigue management.  
 
Fatigue estimate regression indicated with the black and red curved lines. 
Figure 60. Weekly View of a Crewmember’s Duty Schedule. Source: 
Mollicone and Bruneau (2018). 
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Figure 61. Histogram View of Fatigue Levels Exhibited by 
Crewmembers Over a Chosen Timeframe. Source: Mollicone and 
Bruneau (2018). 
 
Figure 62. Custom Date Range Selection for Analysis Screenshot. 
Source: Mollicone and Bruneau (2018).
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APPENDIX D. INDIVIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL 
 
Figure 63. Individual Risk Management Tool. Source: DON (2017a, p. 4)
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APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL SMART FIGURES 
 
Figure 64. Operations Department Filtered Average Work Activity Trends from September 8–13, 2020 
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Figure 66. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Work Activity by Department 
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Figure 67. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Work Activity by Division 
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Figure 68. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Sleep/Rest Activity by Department 
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Figure 69. Initial versus Case Comparisons for Average Sleep/Rest Activity by Division 
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Figure 70. Initial versus Case Comparisons for the Number of Critical Risk Individuals by Department 
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Figure 71. Initial versus Case Comparisons for the Number of Serious Risk Individuals by Department 
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Figure 72. Initial versus Case Comparisons for the Number of Critical Risk Individuals by Division 
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Figure 73. Initial versus Case Comparisons for the Number of Serious Risk Individuals by Division
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SUPPLEMENTALS: WORKBOOK, MANUAL, TOOL AND VIDEO 
The Scheduling Management Aid for Risk Tracking (SMART) tool was developed 
in Microsoft Excel. The decision aid systematically collects user activity data and provides 
users with trend analysis and human performance risk assessment data. The prototype’s 
heuristics and outputs enable users to make data-driven crew resource management 
decisions and implement targeted human performance risk mitigations. A description of 
the supplemental materials included with this work are listed as follows:  
1. SMART Template: This macro-enabled workbook contains the SMART 
prototype. The file contains some pre-filled data fields to provide users 
with illustrative examples.  
2. SMART User Manual: This file contains detailed information regarding 
the technical aspects of the prototype (e.g., formatting structure, formulas, 
etc.), operator instructions, and troubleshooting steps.  
3. SMART Data File: This macro-enabled spreadsheet contains the notional 
data created for the thesis along with the results utilized during data 
analysis.  
4. SMART Tutorial Demonstration: This presentation contains visual and 
audio narrations to assist users with employing the SMART prototype. 
The presentation also contains troubleshooting recommendations, 
functionality demonstrations, and user tips for the prototype.  
Parties interested in obtaining a copy of any or all the supplementals listed above 
are directed to contact the Naval Postgraduate School Dudley Knox Library. 
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